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Abstract
This paper examines how fair value accounting can create ﬁnancial contagion among
banks and therefore increase bank regulators' costs of protecting insured depositors.
Prior research mainly focuses on the economic consequences of marking down, whereas
I contribute to the literature by providing a novel trade-oﬀ of marking up. On the one
hand, by marking its assets up, a healthy bank obtains adequate capital to absorb a
failing bank which would otherwise be liquidated in a less eﬃcient secondary market,
thereby saving regulators' costs. On the other hand, the otherwise healthy bank
becomes more leveraged and thus may face excessive default risk after this merger,
leading to ﬁnancial contagion and increased overall costs for regulators.
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Introduction
Since the last ﬁnancial crisis, the use of fair value accounting has been at the center
of policy debate among regulators, accounting standard setters and other professional
associations. Supporters argue that fair value contains more relevant and timely infor-
mation vis-à-vis book value. With additional information, investors are able to make
more informed decisions, regulators can take corrective actions more promptly, and
market monitoring is also improved. Therefore, fair value accounting can enhance the
stability of the economy. Opponents, however, point out that fair value accounting
creates excessive and artiﬁcial volatility in prices that is unrelated to fundamental
value. During recessions, the market for distressed assets is far from a frictionless
competitive market because these assets are extremely illiquid. Furthermore, some
healthy institutions are forced to mark their assets down and consequently become
insolvent, even if they would have survived under historical cost accounting. In sum-
mary, fair value accounting can lead to procyclicality precisely because of marking
down. Although the debate is multifaceted, the spotlight has consistently been on the
downward spirals resulting from marking down, whereas the economic consequences
of marking up receive less attention. In this paper, I bridge the gap and study how
fair value accounting, especially marking up, aﬀects banks' real decisions, the optimal
strategy of bank regulators, and the resulting resolution costs, which are deﬁned as
the expected costs of protecting all insured depositors in failed banks.1
1The economic magnitude of resolution costs in the U.S. is quite signiﬁcant, especially during
ﬁnancial crises. For example, data provided by the FDIC's Historical Statistics on Banking show
that total resolution costs from 1986-2017 were estimated to be $182.4 billion, much of which were
accumulated during 1988-1992 and 2007-2011. More details are provided in Table 4 and Figure 9 in
Appendix C. In addition, Hoggarth, Reidhill, and Sinclair (2004) ﬁnd that the cumulative output
losses in the banking crisis of the past 25 years have amounted to 15% to 20% of annual GDP. The
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I develop a simple model with two banks that are subject to capital regulation by
a prudential regulator whose objective is to protect all insured depositors. Each bank
raises deposits and issues equity to fund a risky investment, and banks' objective is
to maximize the expected return for shareholders. Subsequently, each bank obtains
new information about the expected payoﬀ of its investment. In a benchmark which
I denote as (pure) historical cost accounting, information will not be reﬂected and
banks' assets are recorded at the origination costs. However, banks are required to
report the information on their balance sheets under fair value accounting. As a
result, a bank can be insolvent if its assets are critically impaired, and thus will be
closed by the regulator even though its investment has not matured yet. The regulator
may have two methods for resolving the failed bank: selling the bank's assets in a
potentially ineﬃcient secondary market, or merging the failed bank with a healthy
bank. The regulator's preferred resolution method depends on the circumstances of
failures, which in turn results in interesting trade-oﬀs between the costs and beneﬁts
of marking down and marking up.
The intuition is as follows: Fair value accounting requires that a bank marks its
assets down if subsequent information indicates credit deterioration. As a result, the
regulator is able to intervene with the troubled bank immediately to prevent further
losses, thereby protecting depositors in the troubled bank. In other words, marking
down reduces the regulator's costs of resolving the troubled bank. However, if no
other healthy bank is able to acquire this troubled bank, the regulator must sell the
troubled bank's assets in an illiquid secondary market, which decreases the proceeds
and increase the regulator's costs of resolving the troubled bank. Therefore, the costs
and beneﬁts of marking banks' assets down are relatively straightforward.
However, the trade-oﬀ of marking up is more nuanced. First, a healthy bank can
mark its assets up following favorable information, thereby obtaining extra capital
which in turn allows the bank to take more risk. One particular form of risk-taking
costs are usually paid from a deposit insurance fund or through capital injections by the government
if the fund has been exhausted. Therefore, it is the taxpayers who ultimately pay for these costs.
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examined in the model is to absorb the failed bank, which would otherwise be liqui-
dated in the secondary market. Because the healthy bank is more eﬃcient, marking
up further reduces the regulator's costs of resolving the troubled bank. On the other
hand, the healthy bank may become more fragile as this merger increases its leverage
and decreases its capital ratio. As a consequence, if the troubled bank eventually fails,
it may cause the healthy bank to fail as well, because the two banks' balance sheets
are connected after the acquisition. This phenomenon would happen even though the
otherwise healthy bank could have survived if there were no interbank acquisition.
In other words, one bank's failure increases the likelihood that another healthy bank
will fail in the future, consistent with the observation of ﬁnancial contagion.2 As a
consequence, depositors in the healthy bank may become exposed to excessive default
risk after the acquisition, thereby increasing regulator's costs of protecting depositors
in the healthy bank. Therefore, the net eﬀect taking all depositors together is not
obvious. I ﬁnd that marking up increases total resolution costs for the regulator
if banks' investments are not suﬃciently proﬁtable, banks are highly leveraged and
fair value accounting is not informative about future cash ﬂow.3 Overall, my results
provide some novel implications for bank regulators and policy makers.
In addition, I ﬁnd that accounting measurement can aﬀect banks' capital struc-
ture decisions, consistent with the way accounting aﬀects other management decisions
2In prior literature, ﬁnancial contagion is typically deﬁned as shocks that aﬀect one bank prop-
agating to other banks through increased systemic risk or bank runs (see, for example, Alvarez and
Barlevy (2015) or Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In my paper, a healthy bank could have been more
stable if the other bank is also ﬁnancially healthy. Nevertheless, because the other bank is ﬁnancially
distressed and fails, the healthy bank becomes more volatile and faces higher risk after acquiring the
failed bank. In other words, one bank's failure has negative externality on the other bank, consistent
with the deﬁnition of ﬁnancial contagion at the observation level.
3In fact, ﬁnancial contagion resulted from interbank acquisitions and abuses of accounting mea-
surement by regulators has been observed in the past, and a well-known instance is the Savings and
Loan crisis. In the early 1980s, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) faced a
serious deﬁcit in their insurance fund because of historically high interest rates. To avoid bankruptcy,
the FSLIC adopted misguided accounting policies to encourage healthy thrifts to acquire troubled
institutions. For example, the 10-year amortization restriction on goodwill was extended to no
more than 40 years, leading to a dramatic increase in goodwill for the acquirer. As a consequence,
healthy thrifts kept acquiring insolvent thrifts and goodwill constituted a large proportion of their
regulatory capital, as shown in Figures 10 and 11 in Appendix C. In the end, the entire industry was
devastated as more healthy thrifts failed: ﬁnal resolution costs were estimated at more than $160
billion, which included $132 billion from federal taxpayersmuch of which could have been avoided
had regulators not merged insolvent thrifts with other institutions.
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in the real eﬀects literature (Kanodia and Sapra, 2016). Speciﬁcally, because share-
holders are protected by limited liability, banks prefer to raise more deposits and
less equity. Under historical cost accounting, banks are always solvent because the
regulatory capital does not change, and therefore the regulator has no basis to in-
tervene with any bank.4 In return, banks raise the maximum deposits subject to
capital regulation to exploit the beneﬁt of limited liability. By contrast, banks face a
trade-oﬀ under fair value accounting: First, banks still prefer to raise more deposits
for the same reason stated above. However, if a bank did not issue enough equity,
its capital reserves may not be adequate to absorb future unexpected losses. In other
words, banks could become insolvent following negative shocks and thus be closed
by the regulator. As a result, banks may forfeit some beneﬁts of limited liability to
eliminate the possibility of closure. Therefore, marking down can provide banks with
an incentive to issue extra equity, which will in turn decrease systemic leverage and
reduce the expected resolution costs. However, the eﬀect of marking up is more sub-
tle. Because of marking up, banks may be granted with an opportunity to take more
risk by acquiring an insolvent bank. In anticipation of this possibility, banks' capi-
tal structure decisions will also change. I ﬁnd that marking up may dampen banks'
incentive to issue extra equity under certain conditions and thus increase systemic
leverage and aggravate the regulator's resolution costs.
1.1 Literature Review
This paper is related to three strands of literature. First, there is a large literature on
prudential regulation and optimal intervention. For example, Dewatripont and Tirole
(1994) build a general framework on how external intervention aﬀects managerial
incentives and how to implement the intervention. Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz
(2000) ﬁnd that capital regulation, while induces prudent behavior, harms banks'
4Deposit insurance, capital regulation, liquidity requirements and many other rules are
widespread across the globe. I only focus on capital regulation in this paper because it is perhaps
the most important micro-prudential regulation and accounting measurement is a key determinant
of banks' regulatory capital.
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franchise values and encourages gambling, and therefore can be ineﬃcient. Acharya
and Yorulmazer (2007) show that the ex-post optimal closure policy may give banks
incentives to herd and thus becomes sub-optimal from an ex-ante standpoint. My
paper studies how accounting measurement interacts with the optimal intervention
policy, which in turn aﬀects banks' real decisions and regulators' payoﬀs. In this
burgeoning literature in accounting, the closest related paper is Bertomeu, Mahieux,
and Sapra (2017), who examine how policy makers use accounting regulation and
prudential regulation in tandem to discipline banks' risk-taking and maximize social
welfare. The primary diﬀerence is that they assume that policy makers determine
a capital requirement and commit to a measurement system together to control ex
post incentives to intervene, whereas I compares diﬀerent accounting regimes given
predetermined prudential regulation (See Section 6.2).
Second, there are numerous studies on the economic consequences of fair value ac-
counting in diﬀerent settings. Beatty and Liao (2014) and Acharya and Ryan (2016)
provide comprehensive review of this literature. In the context of bank regulations,
Li (2017) examines how diﬀerent accounting regimes aﬀect banks' risk-taking and,
in turn, aﬀect bank regulators; Lu, Sapra, and Subramanian (2016) investigate how
agency conﬂicts interact with fair value accounting aﬀect prudential regulation; Bleck
and Gao (2016) study the eﬀect of marking to market on banksâ loan origination
and retention decisions; Corona, Nan, and Zhang (2017) show that banks may vol-
untarily adopt fair value accounting to deter competition in the deposit market. In
other contexts not speciﬁc to banking, Gigler, Kanodia, and Venugopalan (2013)
ﬁnd that fair value accounting increases the volatility of the ﬁrm's wealth, which in
turn distorts ﬁrms' assets allocating decision and decreases social welfare; Bleck and
Liu (2007) show that historic cost accounting can make the ﬁnancial market more,
rather than less volatile by veiling true economic performance. Reis and Stocken
(2007) study the measurement of nonﬁnancial assets in imperfectly competitive mar-
kets. They ﬁnd that fair value accounting can reveal a ﬁrm's inventory holding in
the presence of cost uncertainty, and therefore improve the informativenessof ﬁnan-
cial reports relative to historical cost accounting. Marinovic (2017) studies the eﬀect
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of accounting measurement regimes that apply to an asset on the auction for that
asset. Bushman and Williams (2012) provides empirical evidence that high quality
accounting measured by timely recognition of loan loss provision improves market
disciplining of banks' risk-taking .
Lastly, this paper also sheds light on the connection between ﬁnancial contagion
and fair value accounting. Previous literature have focused on the vicious cycle eﬀect
resulting from marking down. For example, Plantin, Sapra, and Shin (2008) show
that the additional information contained in market prices can lead to coordination
failures among ﬁnancial institutions. As a result, contagion arises through the ﬁre-sale
externality in which sales of distressed assets further depress asset prices and induce
additional sales of other institutions. Allen and Carletti (2008) ﬁnd that marking
down could lead to ﬁnancial contagion in the spirit of Allen and Gale (2000). They
suggest that using market prices to assess insolvency is not desirable because market
prices reﬂect liquidity available instead of intrinsic values. Diﬀerent from the above
two papers which mainly focus on marking down, I ﬁnd that marking up can also
lead to ﬁnancial contagion, consistent with the contamination eﬀect documented by
Banal-Estañol, Ottaviani, and Winton (2013). Speciﬁcally, by marking assets up, a
healthy bank obtains free capital that allows it to acquire an insolvent bank; however,
the healthy bank may become more vulnerable to failure after the acquisition, leading
to ﬁnancial contagion and excessive default risk faced by depositors. To the best of
my knowledge, the speciﬁc mechanism resulted from marking up has not been studied
before, and it may provide interesting implications for accounting standard setting
and bank regulation.
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Model
2.1 Model Setup
The model has universal risk neutrality and four dates.
Date 1
To capture contagion in the most parsimonious way, I assume there are two iden-
tical banks in the ﬁnancial system denoted as i and j. Banks are wealth constrained,
and therefore must raise capital to fund investmentsfrom two sources: depositsD from
dispersed depositors and equity E from external shareholders (Mehran and Thakor,
2011).5 All deposits are fully insured by the FDIC and the interest rate and insurance
premium are normalized to 0.6 In addition, there is no conﬂict of interest between
the bank's manager and its shareholders, so the manager's objective is to maximize
the expected payoﬀ for shareholders. Two banks make capital structure decisions
simultaneously at date 1.
5Bank capital is privately costly to shareholders because of asymmetric information or the tax
beneﬁt of debts. In addition to these private costs, bank capital is also socially costly because
capital will substitute information-insensitive and liquid securities such as demand deposits, which
are valuable for depositors. Including private costs in the model will not qualitatively change my
results, whereas endogenizing the social costs is beyond the scope of this paper. Furthermore, I
assume banks do not have access to external capital after date 1, which can be extended as an
alternative benchmark in Appendix B.2.
6Deposit insurance is heavily subsidized, especially for weaker banks. The literature has shown
that the insurance premium is not appropriately risk adjusted (Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor,
1992). For example, the FDIC based its assessments on $11.99 trillion of liabilities at the end of
2011. However, only 206 of the 813 institutions on the FDIC's problem list paid more than 25 basis;
0.28% percent of the asset base paid more than 35 basis points (Bulow and Klemperer, 2013). In
addition, risk sensitive regulation may also have side eﬀects (Bleck, 2016). In my model, suppose the
insurance premium can perfectly reﬂect the risk, then the regulator is able to break even. However,
the healthy bank will face an increased cost of deposits after the acquisition, and thus may have less
incentive to take over the insolvent bank. Therefore, a risk sensitive insurance premium may also
be costly.
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After collecting capital from depositors and shareholders, each bank is faced with
a risky investment I which repays R at the terminal date if the investment succeeds;
otherwise the repayment is normalized to 0 if the investment fails. The prior proba-
bility of success is q ∈ (1
2
, 1) and and the investment is proﬁtable ex ante, i.e., qR > I.
In other words, bank's terminal cash ﬂow can be considered as a random variable R˜
R˜ =
R, if succeed, with probablity q0, if fail, with probablity 1− q
and R˜i and R˜j are assumed to be independent for simplicity.7
Furthermore, bank regulation, especially capital regulation is important due to
banks' risk-shifting incentive, i.e., banks are inclined to take excessive risk because of
limited liability and deposit insurance. The excessive risk will in turn hurt depositors,
increase regulators' costs and thus need to be disciplined.8 Therefore, I assume that a
prudential regulator referred to as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
commits to certain capital regulation to discipline excessive risk-taking and protect
insured depositors.9 The capital regulation is exogenous and consists of an interior
7In reality, banks are aﬀected by macroeconomic shocks and their returns are correlated as a
consequence. (i) Including this correlation will pollute my results without adding new insights: Sup-
pose we observe that two banks failing together, it becomes extremely diﬃcult to disentangle the
eﬀect of common shocks from the eﬀect of contagion, which is the strategic interaction between the
two banks. Therefore, the easiest way to examine contagion is to leave out the eﬀect of common
shocks. Meanwhile, prior research such as Allen and Carletti (2008) ﬁnd that banks may choose
diﬀerent risk exposure ex ante to become the sole survivor, which seem consistent with this assump-
tion. (ii) As a robustness test, I also include a correlation between R˜i and R˜j and ﬁnd that the
main results hold qualitatively as long as the correlation is not too high. (iii) To interpret this
assumption of independence, the two banks can be specialized in diﬀerent industries or located in
diﬀerent geographic locations.
8Suppose there is no capital regulation, banks will raise zero equity in equilibrium because share-
holders are protected by limited liability, thereby shifting all default risk to depositors. Furthermore,
because shareholders' money is not at stake, banks may invest in negative NPV projects and bet
on the upside, consistent with prior literature that deposit insurance and limited liability induce
excessive risk-taking. By contrast, if shareholders have skin in the game as well, the risk-shifting
incentive can be mitigated.
9 (i) I consider the FDIC as the main regulator and its objective is to reduce expected resolution
costs. (ii) Banks in the model can be thought of as traditional commercial banks as modern banks
such as shadow banks are quite diﬀerent. For example, shadow banks are highly leveraged, heavily
dependent on wholesale funding and more vulnerable to liquidity risk, and not subject to capital
regulation.
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minimum capital requirement φ and a solvency requirement deﬁned as follows10:
0 φ
capital
ratio
insolvent undercapitalized well capitalized
closure no interventionregulatory supervision
Figure 2.1: Prudential Regulation
(i) A bank is well capitalized if its capital ratio11 is above φ. In this case, the bank
is allowed to take more risk and will not be intervened by the regulator.
(ii) A bank is undercapitalized if its capital ratio is below φ. In this case, the bank
is subject to regulatory supervision and restricted from taking more risk, such
as underwriting more loans or paying out dividends.
(iii) A bank is critically undercapitalized or insolvent if its capital ratio falls below
0, and the bank will be immediately closed by the regulator.
Because of the minimum capital requirement φ, banks must raise enough equity at
date 1 such that E ≥ φI .
Date 2
After investments have been made, each bank will receive additional information
Y˜ ∈ {H,L} about the likelihood that its investment will succeed. I assume the signal
itself is a random variable and the prior probability of realizing H is q. In addition,
the joint probability between Y˜ and R˜ is as follows:
10To simplify the algebra, I assume φ < φ < φ¯ where φ = 1− (4q−1)R(5q−1)I and φ¯ = min{ qR−I(2q−1)I , 1− q2}.
However, the main result does not change qualitatively even if the assumption is relaxed.
11 (i) The numerator of capital ratio is regulatory capital, which starts from the GAAP number,
plus some adjustments called prudential ﬁlters. For example, goodwill and other intangible assets
are not included in calculating regulatory capital now. The eﬀect of prudential ﬁlters on banks'
behavior is interesting but beyond the scope of this paper. (ii) There are two types of capital in
practice: tier 1 capital, which consists largely of shareholders' equity and disclosed reserves, and
tier 2 capital or supplementary capital, consisting of undisclosed reserves, general provisions, etc. I
do not diﬀerentiate them for simplicity. (iii) The denominator is the risk weighted assets, and any
risk-free assets such as cash or treasury bills have 0 weight.
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R 0
H q2 +  q(1− q)− 
L q(1− q)−  (1− q)2 + 
where 0 <  < q(1 − q). As a result, the correlation coeﬃcient between Y˜ and R˜ is
λ
.
=

q(1− q)
12, and the posterior probabilities of success are
PH = Prob(Succeed|H) = q + (1− q)λ
PL = Prob(Succeed|L) = q − qλ
When λ = 0, the signal is completely uninformative, i.e., PH = PL = q. When λ = 1,
the signal is perfectly informative, i.e., PH = 1, PL = 0. Lastly, PH and 1 − PL are
both strictly increasing in λ. Therefore, I denote λ as the informativeness of fair
value accounting. In practice, λ may be aﬀected by the accuracy of valuation models
using level 2 inputs, or the precision of managers' private information using level 3
inputs.13
In a benchmark case which I denote as (pure form) historical cost accounting,
information Y˜ is not reﬂected on banks' balance sheets and assets are always recorded
as the origination costs I. In contrast, banks must report the information under fair
value accounting. Speciﬁcally, if the signal is L, the bank is forced to mark its assets
down from the origination costs I to the fair value PLR, and its regulatory capital
decreases accordingly by the same amount of marking down.14 By contrast, if the
12The covariance is Cov(R˜, Y˜ ) = E[R˜Y˜ ]− E[R˜]E[Y˜ ]. Since E[R˜Y˜ ] = r1Y1(q2 + ) + r1Y2(q(1−
q) − ) + r2Y1(q(1 − q) − ) + r2Y2((1 − q)2 + ) and Cov(R˜, Y˜ ) = (r1 − r2)(Y1 − Y2) = R2, it
is easy to see that Corr(R˜, Y˜ ) = Cov(R˜,Y˜ )√
V ar(R˜)
√
V ar(Y˜ )
= q(1−q) . This information structure has also
been use in prior literature such as Huang and Ratnovski (2011), Burkhardt and Strausz (2009). To
interpret this information structure, suppose Y˜ represents a diﬀerent risky investment with a shorter
maturity, and the return of the two investments are positively correlated. Therefore, the realization
of the short maturity investment Y˜ is informative about the long maturity investment R˜.
13I assume managers have no incremental information given the realization of Y , diﬀerent from
other models about adverse selection such as Reis and Stocken (2007), Bleck and Gao (2016) and
Marinovic (2017). Therefore, the information content in market prices is exogenous.
14 Fair value is deﬁned by the FASB as the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to
transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date.
This value-in-exchange perspective can be ineﬃcient as shown in the literature (Plantin et al., 2008);
for example, during ﬁnancial crises, quoted prices in an illiquid market can deviate from fundamental
10
signal is H, the bank is allowed to mark its assets up to PHR and thereby obtains
extra free capital by the same amount of marking up.
Date 3
Because of marking up or marking down, banks' capital ratio will also change.
Suppose a bank receives L and becomes insolvent, it will be closed by the regulator
although the investment has not matured yet. Nevertheless, after taking over the
insolvent bank, the regulator must resolve its assets due to lack of expertise in us-
ing them. Depending on the circumstances of failure, the regulator may have three
resolution methods:
1. A deposit payoﬀ: The FDIC is appointed as the receiver of the failed bank and
will liquidate its assets. All insured depositors are directly paid oﬀ.
2. A purchase and assumption (P&A agreement): A healthy institution (bank or
thrift) acquires the failed bank, including its assets and all insured deposits.15
3. An open bank assistance (OBA agreement): The FDIC provides ﬁnancial as-
sistance to a failed bank such as placing deposits, making loans, etc,. Since the
OBA agreement has never been used since 1992, I only consider the ﬁrst two
methods.16
In a deposit payoﬀ, the FDIC sells the failed bank's assets in a secondary mar-
ket, which can be ineﬃcient for several reasons: (i) A bank monitors borrowers on
behalf of dispersed arm's length investors, thereby saving duplicated eﬀorts of moni-
toring (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). (ii) A bank produces valuable information about
borrowers via relationship lending or private communication with the management
(Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984). (iii) A large proportion of banks' assets, such as
values. Therefore, to diﬀerentiate with prior ﬁndings, I deﬁne fair value as the expected payoﬀ given
the asset is held by banks, which is more in line with the value-in-use perspective.
15A P&A agreement may be assisted by the regulator; for example, the acquisition of Bear Sterns
by JPMorgan Chase was facilitated by assistance from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The
ﬁnal selling price was $10 per share, a price far below its pre-crisis 52-week high of $133 per share,
but not as low as the $2 per share originally agreed upon between Bear Sterns and JPMorgan Chase.
16The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), requires regu-
lators to take to take prompt corrective action (PCA) when the depository institutions is critically
undercapitalized. See Section 6.1 for more details.
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mortgage loans, are subject to ﬁre sales discount in an illiquid market (Corona et al.,
2014). For these reasons, I assume that outside users cannot generate R, but only
δR, when the investment succeeds at date 4 (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007). As a
result, the distressed assets are sold in the secondary market at δPLR, and 1 − δ is
denoted as the liquidity discount.
In contrast, the above ineﬃciency can be alleviated in a P&A agreement because a
healthy bank can provide similar services as the failed bank. For simplicity, I assume
there is no ineﬃciency in a P&A agreement and the distressed assets are sold to
the healthy bank at the fair value PLR.17 However, since the insolvent bank has
negative equity, the regulator must compensate the acquirer by providing some forms
of subsidy. I assume the subsidy take the simplest form as direct capital injection,
which is equal to D−PLR. Given the subsidy, if the hypothetical capital ratio of the
conglomerate is below φ, the healthy bank does not have enough capital to absorb
all the risk. This could happen because the acquisition increases the healthy bank's
leverage and lowers its capital ratio.18 Lastly, I assume that dividend payout is not
allowed before the investment matures.
Date 4
Banks' investments mature and all depositors are paid oﬀ. If a bank does not have
enough cash to fulﬁll its obligation, it declares bankruptcy and the FDIC will cover
the shortfall. Otherwise, shareholders are residual claimants after all depositors are
fully repaid by banks.
In summary, the model is described by the following timeline:
17In practice, the FDIC will usually market the insolvent institution as widely as possible to
encourage competition among bidders. In a perfectly competitive market, the FDIC has the full
bargaining power so the equilibrium price will be such that bidders are indiﬀerent between acquiring
and not acquiring. By contrast, if there is no competition and the acquirer has the full bargaining
power, the price is equal to the secondary market price δPLR. I assume the selling price is the fair
value PLR, which lies in the middle of two extreme cases. However, relaxing this assumption will
not qualitatively aﬀect my results.
18(i) The FDIC also oﬀers other types of subsidies in reality; for example, the acquirer could
purchase the assets with a discount or enter into a loss-share agreement with the FDIC, etc,. (ii) As
an anecdote, the failure of IndyMac Bank in 2008 was the 3rd largest bank failure ever. In 2009,
IndyMac Bank was acquired by OneWest Bank along with controversial shared loss agreements.
However, the FDIC subsequently disclosed that it has already paid out more than $1 billion to
OneWest bank under shared loss agreements, and that it expects to pay out an additional $1.4
billion to the bank before 2019.
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Two banks decide
capital structure
simultaneously.
The balance sheet
is Ei +Di = I and
Ei ≥ φI
Date 1
Information Y˜ is
reported under FV
accounting.
The bank may
mark up or mark
down based on Y˜ .
Date 2
Insolvent banks are
revealed and closed.
The bank regulator
chooses the optimal
resolution method S.
Date 3
Investments mature
and depositors are
paid oﬀ.
Date 4
Figure 2.2: Time Line
2.2 Equilibrium
As two banks make their capital structure decisions simultaneously, the bank's de-
cision is based on its conjecture of the other bank's strategy and its conjecture of
the regulator's resolution method. Therefore, a rational expectation equilibrium is
deﬁned as follows:
Equilibrium Deﬁnition. A rational expectation equilibrium consists of {Di, Dj,S}
such that:
1. Banks maximize the expected payoﬀs for shareholders conditional on the conjec-
ture, i.e., Di ∈ argmaxE[Πi|Dˆj, Sˆ], and Dj ∈ argmaxE[Πj|Dˆi, Sˆ].
2. The regulator chooses the optimal resolution method S after closing a bank.
3. The conjectures obey rational expectations, i.e., Di = Dˆi, Dj = Dˆj,S = Sˆ.
The equilibrium is solved backward: I ﬁrst study the regulator's optimal resolution
method after closing the insolvent bank at date 3, and then examine banks' capital
structure decisions at date 1.
2.2.1 Historical Cost Accounting
Since information Y˜ will not be reported under historical cost accounting, banks'
assets are always recorded at the origination costs I. As a result, there is no basis for
the regulator to intervene. In anticipation of the regulator's action, banks solve the
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following optimization problem:
max
D,E
q(R−D)− E (2.1)
s.t. E ≥ φI
E +D = I
Because of limited liability, shareholders at most lose their initial capital contribution
E if the investment fails at date 4. In contrast, if the investment succeeds, sharehold-
ers obtain a positive return after all depositors are paid oﬀ. Apparently, equation (1)
is strictly increasing in D, suggesting that banks choose the maximum (minimum)
deposits (equity), which is consistent with classic bankruptcy theory: The borrower
prefers to use other people's money, because the downside risk is completely borne
by creditors. To simplify notation, I denote the maximum deposits that banks could
raise under minimum capital requirement as DF = (1− φ)I.
Proposition 1. Under historical cost accounting, banks raise the minimum equity,
i.e., DHC = DF .
2.2.2 Fair Value Accounting
Under fair value accounting, information Y˜ must be reﬂected on the bank's balance
sheet: If H is realized, the bank marks up its assets to PHR and consequently obtains
additional capital PHR−D. If L is realized, the bank marks down its assets to PLR
and its capital reduces to PLR − D. Therefore, a bank will be closed if and only if
the following two conditions are satisﬁed: (i) The bank receives L; (ii) Marking down
is suﬃciently severe such that PLR < D.
A Benchmark Case
I ﬁrst study a benchmark case in which a direct payoﬀ is the only resolution method.
In this case, there is no strategic interaction between the two banks and E[ΠB|Dˆj, Sˆ] =
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E[ΠB|S]. Therefore, the bank's objective is:
max
D≤DF
E[ΠB] =

q(R−D)− (I −D), if DF < PLR
qPH(R−D)− (I −D), if DF > PLR and D > PLR
q(R−D)− (I −D), if DF > PLR and D < PLR
To understand the objective function, if accounting is not informative at all such
that PLR ≥ DF , a bank will stay solvent even if it raises the maximum deposits and
receives L. This is a trivial case as accounting information becomes irrelevant, so I
make the following assumption:
Assumption. Accounting is at least relevant, i.e., λ > 1− DF
qR
.
= λC.
Given accounting is relevant, if a bank raises too much deposits and receives L, it
becomes insolvent and thus will be closed by the regulator. Therefore, shareholders
obtain a positive return only when H is realized at date 2 (the probability is q),
and the investment succeeds at date 4 (the posterior probability of success upon H
is PH). In stark contrast, if the bank issues extra equity such that D ≤ PLR, it is
always solvent regardless of the signal realization, and thus will never be closed by
the regulator.
Compared to Equation (1.1), D aﬀects banks' objectives in two opposing direc-
tions: First, the bank still prefers to raise more deposits to maximize the beneﬁt of
limited liability. On the other hand, if the bank's leverage is too high, it faces the
possibility of being closed by the regulator. Therefore, banks face a trade-oﬀ between
the beneﬁts of limited liability and the aversion to closure, and the optimal capital
structure is as follows:
Lemma 1. In the benchmark case, there exists a unique λB such that banks choose
DB =
PLR, if λ < λBDF , otherwise
In addition, λB is increasing in R and decreasing in DF .
15
Proof. All proofs are in the appendix.
Lemma 1 shows that banks voluntarily issue extra equity if accounting is not too
informative (yet still relevant). To gain the intuition, if accounting is too informative,
PLR becomes very small; therefore, banks need to raise a large amount of equity ex
ante to prevent closure, which is too costly for shareholders. In contrast, if the
informativeness is low, banks only need to raise a small amount of equity to prevent
closure. In the following text, I denote D = PLR as when banks raise extra equity.
Lemma 1 suggests that the threat of regulatory closure resulting from marking down
can provide incentives for banks to raise more equity, and thus decreases systemic
leverage. Finally, the comparative statics are also intuitive: When the investment
is more proﬁtable, banks are more averse to closure and thus more prone to raising
extra equity. Similarly, when the maximum deposits that banks could raise decrease,
the beneﬁts of limited liability become smaller, so banks have stronger incentives to
raise extra equity.
Bank Acquisition
After establishing the basic trade-oﬀ established, I include the P&A agreement as an
alternative resolution method and ask the following question: Is a healthy bank able
and willing to acquire an insolvent bank? Without loss of generality, I assume bank
j receives L and becomes insolvent, and bank i receives H. Suppose bank i acquired
j; then the balance sheet of the conglomerate after the acquisition becomes:19
PHR + PLR︸ ︷︷ ︸
risky investments
+Dj − PLR︸ ︷︷ ︸
subsidy
= (Di +Dj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
total deposits
+E + (PHR− I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
capital
(2.2)
19FAS ASC 805 (formerly FAS 141R) Business Combinations sets forth the accounting standards
for bank mergers and acquisitions. In general, the acquirer should use purchase accounting and
record both assets and liabilities at the fair value. For example, if the impairment of the purchased
assets is other-than-temporary, the amount of expected cash ﬂows that exceeds the fair value is
recorded as accretable yield and will subsequently be recognized as interest income over the life of
the loan.
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Initially, bank i capital ratio is
Ei
I
≥ φ. If bank i receives H, its capital ratio becomes
Ei + (PHR− I)
I + (PHR− I) > φ. Finally, bank i's capital ratio after the acquisition decreases to
Ei + (PHR− I)
I + (PHR− I) + PLR .
Lemma 2. The healthy bank has enough capital to acquire the insolvent bank given
φ < φ¯.
Lemma 2 is intuitive. Since accounting is relevant, i.e., λ > λC , the information
content of H is suﬃciently high such that PH will be large. As a result, the healthy
bank obtains a large amount of capital by marking its assets up. At the same time,
the information content of L is suﬃciently high such that PL will be small, so the de-
nominator of the capital ratio only increases marginally. Taken together, the healthy
bank is always able to acquire the insolvent bank, as long as the minimum capital
requirement is not too high.
Now I examine whether bank i is willing to acquire j. After the acquisition,the
conglomerate (or equivalently, bank i) owns two risky investments with independent
returns, safe investment Dj − PLR, and two groups of depositors Di, Dj. Table 1
shows the payoﬀ structure to bank i's shareholders:
Table 2.1: The Payoﬀ Structure to the Healthy Bank
R˜i R˜j Probability Failure Payoﬀ
R R PHPL No 2R−Di − PLR
R 0 (1− PL)PH ? max{R−Di − PLR, 0}
0 R (1− PH)PL ? max{R−Di − PLR, 0}
0 0 (1− PH)(1− PL) Yes 0
Speciﬁcally, if both investments fail (succeed), the conglomerate will (not) fail for
sure. If only one investment succeeds, however, it is unclear whether the conglomerate
will fail. To simplify notation, I denote R−Di−PLR as when the intermediate return
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is realized. Therefore, the expected payoﬀ for bank i is
∆M(Di) = PHPL(2R−Di − PLR)︸ ︷︷ ︸
both investments succeed
+ (PH + PL − 2PHPL)max{R−Di − PLR, 0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
only one investment succeeds
(2.3)
Lemma 3. The healthy bank's shareholders are better oﬀ after the acquisition.
To understand Lemma 3, banks' equity can be viewed as a call option because of
limited liability, and the option value is increasing in the volatility. In other words,
banks' shareholders are always inclined to engage in riskier investments at the expense
of depositors, consistent with the risk shifting incentive in the literature. Moreover,
acquiring an insolvent bank, by increasing the mean preserving spreads, is equivalent
to taking more risk. Therefore, shareholders in the healthy bank are always better
oﬀ after the acquisition.
The Full Equilibrium
Next, I study the regulator's optimal resolution method at date 3.
Lemma 4. The regulator uses P&A agreements whenever possible.
Lemma 4 suggests that the regulator prefers to use a P&A agreement, as long as
the healthy bank has enough capital to absorb the insolvent bank. To understand the
argument, suppose healthy bank i has suﬃcient capital to acquire insolvent bank j,
but the regulator chooses to liquidate j's assets in the secondary market. In response,
bank i will issue more deposits or sell some safe investments to purchase the assets
from the open market. By doing so, i's shareholders are even better oﬀ because the
purchase the secondary market price will never exceed the price from the regulator.
Therefore, deposit payoﬀs are used only when there is no other healthy bank to
take over the insolvent bank, which is consistent with our real-life observation that
the P&A agreement has been the most preferred method for most of the FDIC's
history.20
20For example, from 1986 through 2017, 2,307 banks out of 2,638 failing or failed bank situations,
or 87.5 %, were resolved with P&A agreements. Deposit payoﬀs were only used in 215 cases, or 8.2
% of the total. More details are provided in Table 4 in Appendix C.
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By rational expectation, banks' conjectured Sˆ must be consistent with the actual
S of the regulator. Now I study the bank's capital structure decision at date 1 and
discuss the following two cases:
Case 1 : Dˆj ≤ PLR, bank i believes that j will never be closed. Therefore, bank
i faces the same trade-oﬀ as in the benchmark: If λ > λB, it chooses Di = DF ;
otherwise it chooses Di = PLR.
Case 2 : Dˆj > PLR, bank i believes that j will be closed at L. Suppose j receives
L and bank i receives H, the regulator will merge the two banks. If both banks
receive L, the regulator will close j for sure and resolve its assets in the secondary
market; however, bank i's solvency status depends on Di. Speciﬁcally, if bank i
chooses Di > PLR, its objective function becomes:
ΠM1 (Di) = q
2PH(R−Di)︸ ︷︷ ︸
both receive H
+ q(1− q)∆M(Di)︸ ︷︷ ︸
i receives H, j receives L
−(I −Di) (2.4)
Equation (1.4) is strictly increasing in Di, suggesting that bank i chooses Di = DF .
Similarly, if bank i chooses Di ≤ PLR, its objective function becomes
ΠM2 (Di) = (1− q)PL(R−Di)︸ ︷︷ ︸
i receives L
+ q2PH(R−Di)︸ ︷︷ ︸
both receive H
+ q(1− q)∆M(Di)︸ ︷︷ ︸
i receives H, j receives L
−(I −Di) (2.5)
Equation (1.5) is also increasing in Di, so bank i chooses Di = PLR. Therefore, bank
i either chooses DF or PLR.
Lemma 5. Given that bank i believes Dˆj > PLR,
1. There exists a unique threshold λM such that Di =
PLR, if λ < λFDF , if λ > λF
2. Furthermore, λF > λB if and only if
R
DF
> α∗.
Lemma 5 suggests that bank i follows a threshold strategy if it believes that
Dˆj > PLR.21 To understand why, the chance to engage in risk shifting remains
21Bank i may choose to raise a large amount of equity so that it can acquire j even if i also
receives L. In the appendix, I show that this strategy is never optimal as long as φ is not too high.
19
q(1 − q) even if bank i voluntarily raises extra equity at date 1. Therefore, bank i
faces the same trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁts of limited liability and the aversion to
closure. Similarly, bank i issues extra equity to prevent potential closure only if it is
not too costly, i.e., if accounting is not extremely informative.
However, the opportunity to engage in additional risk-shifting resulting from
marking up indeed changes bank i's behavior, as reﬂected by λF 6= λB. The in-
tuition is as follows. Suppose R is small and DF is large; then the intermediate
return R −Di − PLR is negative even if bank i raises extra equity. Anticipating the
possibility of being exposed to excessive default risk in the future, bank i becomes
more inclined to take more risk at date 1. In other words, for λ that is close but
less than λB, bank i raises the maximum deposits given Dˆj > PLR, but would raise
extra equity given Dˆj < PLR. Therefore, marking up dampens the bank's incentive
to issue extra equity and thus increases systemic leverage. In stark contrast, suppose
R is large and DF is small; then R−Di − PLR is positive even if bank i chooses the
maximum deposits. Bank i, in turn, anticipates that the potential acquisition will re-
duce its default risk and relies less on the beneﬁts of limited liability. In other words,
for λ that is close but greater than λB, bank i issues extra equity given Dˆj > PLR,
but would raise the maximum deposits given Dˆj < PLR. Therefore, marking up can
reinforce banks' incentives to issue extra equity and thus decrease systemic leverage.
With the above result, I fully characterize the rational expectation equilibrium:
Proposition 2. Under fair value accounting, the regulator uses a P&A agreement
whenever possible. In addition,
1. If λ > max{λB, λF}, Di = Dj = DF is the unique equilibrium.
2. If λ < min{λB, λF}, Di = Dj = PLR is the unique equilibrium.
3. If min{λB, λF} < λ < max{λB, λF}, there are two equilibria:
(a) when λF > λB, Di = DF and Dj = PLR, or Di = PLR and Dj = DF .
(b) when λF < λB, Di = Dj = DF or Di = Dj = PLR.
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To understand Proposition 2, if the informativeness of accounting is too high,
raising extra equity becomes too costly regardless of the possibility of additional risk
shifting. As a result, it is a dominant strategy for both banks to raise the maximum
deposits. Alternatively, if the informativeness is too low, preventing closure by issuing
extra equity becomes more proﬁtable regardless of the other bank's strategy. In other
words, it is a dominant strategy for both banks to issue extra equity. Lastly, if
the informativeness is intermediate, equilibira are self-fulﬁlling. In the ﬁrst case,
λB < λ < λF . Suppose bank i expects that bank j chooses the maximum deposits;
then the best response for bank i is to issue extra equity, as shown in Lemma 5. In
a similar fashion, anticipating that bank i will never be closed, bank j will in return
raise the maximum deposits instead. Therefore, the two banks' decisions are strategic
substitution. In the second case, λF < λ < λB. Suppose bank i expects that bank j
chooses the maximum deposits; then bank i's best response is to raise the maximum
deposits too. Similarly, if bank i expects bank j to issue extra equity, then it is
optimal for bank j to issue extra equity as well. Therefore, the two banks' decisions
are strategic complement.
2.3 Regulators' Resolution Costs
In this section, I study how fair value accounting aﬀects the expected resolution costs
for the bank regulator. Resolution costs are formally deﬁned by the FDIC as the sum
of the expenditures and obligations incurred for a given resolution method, including
any immediate or long-term obligations and any direct or contingent liabilities for
future payment, net of recoveries on assets of the failed bank. In my model, after
closing an insolvent bank at date 3, the FDIC will either pay oﬀ depositors in the
failed bank or subsidize the healthy bank to assist the acquisition depending on the
resolution method. In addition, a bank may also fail after investments mature at date
4 if its cash ﬂow are inadequate to pay oﬀ all depositors, and the FDIC will cover the
shortfall.
This section is structured as follows: First, I disentangle marking up and marking
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down and study their eﬀects separately. Next, I include both eﬀects and examine
whether fair value accounting as a whole increases or decreases resolution costs. Fi-
nally, I consider an alternative accounting regimelower of cost or market and provide
a comprehensive comparison.
2.3.1 Trade-oﬀs: Marking down and Marking up
To parse out the eﬀects of marking up and down, I examine the bank regulator's
optimal intervention policy conditional on signal realizations (Dewatripont and Ti-
role 1994, Bertomeu et. al 2017). To simplify notation, for any signal realization
Y˜i, Y˜j, the expected resolution costs given the regulator intervenes are denoted as
E(CI |{Y˜i, Y˜j}); the expected resolution costs given the regulator forbears are denoted
as E(CNI |{Y˜i, Y˜j}). In addition, total resolution costs are denote as T C. Moreover, I
assume both banks raise the maximum deposits to simplify the analysis.
Table 2.2: Expected Resolution Costs Conditional on Accounting Information
Y˜i, Y˜j E(CNI |{Y˜i, Y˜j}) E(CI |{Y˜i, Y˜j})
H,L (1− PH)DF + (1− PL)DF (DF − PLR) + ECA
L,H (1− PL)DF + (1− PH)DF (DF − PLR) + ECA
L,L 2(1− PL)DF 2(DF − δPLR)
As shown in Table 2, if both banks receive H, they are well capitalized and the
regulator has no justiﬁcation for intervention. If both banks receive L, the only
resolution method is deposit payoﬀs. Therefore, the regulator can either forbear both
banks, or close them and liquidate their assets in the secondary market. Lastly, if only
one bank receives L, an interbank acquisition is sequential rational provided that the
regulator intervenes. In other words, the regulator can either forbear the insolvent
bank, or intervene and merge it with the healthy bank. Suppose the regulator chooses
to merge the two banks; total resolution costs include two parts: the regulatory
subsidy DF −PLR and the expected costs of resolving the conglomerate ECA, which
22
is equal to(1− PH)(1− PL)(DF + PLR) if R > DF + PLR(1− PHPL)(DF + PLR)− [PH(1− PL) + PL(1− PH)]R otherwise
(2.6)
Speciﬁcally, suppose R ≥ DL + PLR, the conglomerate defaults only when both
investments fail. In other words, the acquisition enhances the stability of the healthy
bank, and I deﬁne it as the coinsurance eﬀect. By contrast, if R < Di − PLR, the
conglomerate defaults as long as one investment fails. In other words, the healthy
bank becomes more vulnerable to failure after absorbing the insolvent bank, and I
deﬁne it as the contagion eﬀect. More precisely, the fundamental cause of contagion
is that fair value accounting provides the healthy bank with free capital to engage
in additional risk-taking, which in turn results in negative externality on the healthy
bank. Hence, at the observational level, this phenomenon appears to be consistent
with contagion, although it is essentially caused by banks' risk-shifting incentives. In
appendix B, I show that if marking up is not allowed, the healthy bank must issue
additional equity for the acquisition, and consequently ﬁnancial contagion can be
alleviated.
Proposition 3. Marking down has net beneﬁt on the regulator if and only if δ > δ1.
To understand the trade-oﬀ of marking down, we focus on the case in which both
banks receive L. By forcing banks to mark their assets down following negative in-
formation, the regulator is able to intervene with insolvent banks and prevent further
losses as opposed to forbearance. As a consequence, marking down reduces the regu-
lator's costs of protecting depositors in troubled banks. However, if there is no other
healthy bank to absorb this troubled bank, the regulator must sell the bank's assets
in a less eﬃcient secondary market, thus increasing the regulator's costs. To under-
stand the net eﬀect, suppose the liquidity discount is mild, there is a tension between
its creditors and residual claimants: Depositors prefer to liquidate but shareholders
always wish to continue. Since the regulator's objective is to protect depositors, the
insolvent bank will be closed to prevent further losses. In other words, the beneﬁt
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of marking down outweighs its cost. By contrast, if the liquidity discount is severe,
the secondary market price for the bank's assets becomes so low that both depositors
and shareholders prefer to continue rather than close, i.e., δPLR < PLDF . However,
marking down forces the regulator to intervene by revealing banks' insolvency, sug-
gesting that the cost outweighs its beneﬁt. Proposition 3 is consistent with prior
literature such as Plantin et al. (2008), and the main diﬀerence is that they endo-
genize banks' liquidation decisions whereas I assume the regulator commits to an
intervention policy.
Proposition 4. 1. Marking up alleviates ineﬃcient liquidation but may lead to
contagion and increased costs of protecting the original depositors.
2. Marking up increases total resolution costs only when q is suﬃciently high and
R
DF
and λ are adequately low.22
However, the trade-oﬀ of marking up is more nuanced. To understand the intu-
ition, I focus on the case in which one bank receives L and the other receives H. First,
the acquisition eliminates ineﬃcient liquidation in an illiquid market, thereby further
reducing the regulator's costs of resolving the insolvent bank (as opposed to forbear-
ance). On the other hand, this acquisition has two opposing eﬀects on the healthy
bank: On the asset side, the healthy bank obtains another risky investment which
diversiﬁes the default risk faced by depositors; on the liability side, this acquisition
also leverages up the healthy bank and thus increases the default risk. To under-
stand which eﬀect on the original depositors, I discuss two cases separately. In the
coinsurance case, suppose the healthy bank's own investment fails but the acquired
investment succeeds, the original depositors can still be fully repaid. However, if there
were no acquisition, the healthy bank would have failed and the original depositors
would have received nothing from the bank. In other words, marking up reduces
costs of protecting the original depositors. By contrast, in the contagion case, sup-
pose the healthy bank's own investment succeeds but the acquired investment fails,
22More precisely, λ must be located in an intermediate region, as shown in Appendix A. Loosely
speaking, λ is already suﬃciently low in the contagion case, and thus I interpret this condition as
low informativeness.
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the healthy bank will fail and the original depositors are only partially repaid. Nev-
ertheless, the original depositors would have been fully repaid by the bank if there
were no acquisition. Therefore, marking up may increase the regulator's costs of the
original depositors.
Furthermore, since the regulator's objective is to minimize total resolution costs,
it is important to study the overall eﬀect on all depositors. Proposition 4 suggests
that marking up may increase the overall costs under certain conditions. First, most
of banks' assets, such as mortgage or commercial loans, have a low probability of
default ex ante. In addition, banks' investments may become less proﬁtable during
recessions, and they are also highly leveraged due to the capital crunch eﬀect (Beatty
and Liao, 2011). Under these conditions, if accounting is not adequately informative,
the overall eﬀect of marking up becomes negative. Therefore, I refer to these condi-
tions altogether as when marking up increases overall resolution costs, or equivalently,
marking up has net cost. The intuition is also simple. Suppose banks' proﬁtability
is low, the leverage is high, and the conglomerate realizes the intermediate return;
then the shortfall to pay oﬀ all depositors increases, suggesting that marking up be-
comes more costly. When accounting is less informative, the information content of
L decreases, which means that the healthy bank absorbs more risk in terms of mean
preserving spreads after the acquisition. As a consequence, ﬁnancial contagion is
more likely and marking up decreases overall resolution costs.
2.3.2 Full Comparison: FV versus HC
In last section, I assume that both banks raise the minimum equity to isolate the
eﬀect of marking up and marking down. However, to make a full-ﬂedged comparison
between the historical cost versus fair value accounting, I need to include both trade-
oﬀs and endogenous banks' capital structure decisions by Proportion 2.
First, since information Y˜ is not reported under historical cost accounting, the
expected resolution costs are equal to T CHC = 2(1 − q)DF . Meanwhile, from Table
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2 we know that
E
{H,L}×{H,L}
[
E(CNI |{Y˜i, Y˜j})
]
= 2(1− q)DF = T CHC
The expected resolution costs under historical cost accounting are equal to the case
in which the regulator commits never to intervene. In other words, the only way to
break the commitment is to obfuscate banks' information environment by adopting
historical cost accounting.
In contrast, under fair value accounting, the regulator must intervene with the
insolvent bank and choose the optimal resolution method. As a result, the expected
resolution costs equal the weighted average of E(CI |{Y˜i, Y˜j}) for all possible signal
realizations:
T CFV = E
{H,L}×{H,L}
[
E(CI |{Y˜i, Y˜j})
]
Therefore, fair value accounting reduces the total resolution costs vis-à-vis if and only
if T CFV < T CHC , and the comparison can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 5. Fair value accounting reduces the total resolution costs if either con-
dition is satisﬁed:
1. At least one bank issues extra equity.
2. The liquidity discount is mild, i,e., δ > δ2.
To understand the intuition of Proposition 5, I discuss four cases separately.
Case 1: If λ < min{λB, λF}, both banks raise extra capital and thus no bank
will be closed at the interim date. As a result, total resolution costs are T CFV =
2(1−q)PLR < T CHC , and the regulator unambiguously prefers fair value accounting.
The result is consistent with argument made by supports of fair value accounting: it
improves banks' transparency and unveils credit deterioration (Bleck and Liu, 2007),
which enables the regulator to take corrective actions in a more timely manner com-
pared to historical cost accounting. Banks, faced with the threat of intervention,
become more disciplined and take less risk (Bushman and Williams, 2012). The
26
discipline eﬀect, as manifested by decreased systemic leverage in my model, will con-
sequently provide better protections on depositors and reduce the regulator's costs.
Therefore, because of the disciplinary eﬀect, the total resolution costs under fair value
accounting are lower than historical cost accounting.
Case 2: If λB < λ < λF , one bank issues extra equity while the other chooses the
maximum deposits in equilibrium. Although there are multiple equilibria in this case,
the expected resolution costs are the same. Without loss of generality, I assume bank
i issues extra equity so interbank acquisition could only happen by bank i absorbing j.
Proposition 5 shows that fair value accounting unambiguously reduces the expected
resolution costs, and the intuition is as follows. First, since bank i issues extra equity
because of marking down, the expected costs of resolving bank i are already lower
than historical cost accounting under which bank i would raise the maximum deposits.
Second, lemma 5 implies that
R
DF
must be suﬃciently large such that λB < λF , i.e.,
banks' investment is suﬃciently proﬁtable and leverage is not too high. For these
two reasons, the intermediate return R + Dj − PLR will be enough to pay oﬀ both
groups of depositors. In other words, fair value accounting does not lead to ﬁnancial
contagion. Therefore, because of the partial disciplinary eﬀect, fair value accounting
leads to lower total resolution costs.
Case 3: If λ > max{λB, λF}, both banks raise the maximum deposits. It is
obvious that
(i) fair value accounting reduces total costs if the regulator always prefers to in-
tervene rather than forbear for any signal realization, i.e., E(CI |{L,L}) <
E(CNI |{L,L}), E(CI |{H,L}) < E(CNI |{H,L}).
(ii) historical cost accounting reduces total costs if the regulator always prefers to
forbear rather than intervene for any signal realization, i.e., E(CI |{L,L}) >
E(CNI |{L,L}), E(CI |{H,L}) > E(CNI |{H,L}).
Otherwise, it is not obvious whether fair value accounting increases or decreases
the total resolution costs. Figure 3 describes the regulator's decision tree under fair
value accounting: First, the regulator has no justiﬁcation to intervene with probability
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Fair Value Accounting
L,L
Timely intervention
l
Ineﬃcient liquidation
(1− q) 2
H,L
Eﬃcient resolution L
l
Increased costs of
resolving H
2q(1− q)
H,H No intervention
q
2
Figure 2.3: Fair Value Accounting: Marking down and Marking up
q2. Second, with probability (1 − q)2, the regulator must close both banks and bear
costs resulting from ineﬃcient liquidation. Finally, the insolvent bank will be acquired
by a healthy bank with probability 2q(1 − q), which leads to the trade-oﬀ between
eﬃcient resolution of the insolvent bank versus increased cost of resolving the healthy
bank. Therefore, fair value accounting involves a convex combination of the above
two trade-oﬀs and the expected costs are
2q(1− q) [ECA − PLR + (PH + PL − 1)DF ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
net costs of contagion
+2(1− q)2 PL(DF − δR)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ineﬃcient liquidation
The ﬁrst term represents the potential costs of contagion net of the beneﬁts early
intervention in an eﬃcient market, and the second term represents the trade-oﬀ be-
tween an ineﬃcient liquidation and early intervention. Proposition 5 implies that fair
value accounting is preferred to the regulator if and only if δ > δ2. To understand the
result algebraically, the ﬁrst trade-oﬀ is independent of δ while the second trade-oﬀ
leans toward fair value accounting for a higher δ. In summary, if both banks raise the
maximum deposits, fair value accounting reduces total resolution costs if the liquidity
discount is mild.
Corollary 1. δ2 is decreasing in R and increasing in DF
The comparative statics of are also intuitive: When banks' investment is more
proﬁtable and leverage is low, the regulator prefers to intervene rather than forbear.
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As a result, it becomes more likely that fair value accounting is preferred, i.e., δ2
decreases.
Case 4: If λF < λ < λB, there are two equilibria under fair value accounting
which result in diﬀerent expected resolution costs. If both banks issue extra equity,
fair value accounting leads to lower total resolution costs same as case 1. However, if
both banks raise the maximum deposits, the optimal regime depends on the liquidity
discount for as shown in case 3. Furthermore,
R
DF
must be suﬃciently small to satisfy
λF < λB based on Lemma 5. As a result, the threshold δ2 will be extremely high,
which means that fair value accounting will very possibly decrease total resolution
cost. In summary, the regulator prefers fair value accounting in one equilibrium
because of the disciplinary eﬀect; whereas in the other equilibrium, it is quite likely
that the regulator prefers historical cost accounting.
Figure 4 summarizes the above results.
λC λB λF 1
λ
FV FV FV iﬀ δ > δ2
both extra capital
no closure
disciplinary eﬀect
one bank extra capital
no contagion
partial disciplinary eﬀect
both maximum deposits
possible contagion
no disciplinary eﬀect
Figure 2.4: Accounting Informativeness and Regulators' Preferred Regime
2.3.3 Lower of Cost or Market
In this section, I consider an alternative regimelower of cost or market and com-
pare three accounting regimes collectively. Under the more conservative LCM regime
(Gigler, Kanodia, Sapra, and Venugopalan, 2009), a bank is forced to mark its assets
down at L, but not allowed to mark its assets up at H.23 For simplicity, I only con-
sider the case in which both banks raise the maximum deposits, so the only resolution
23The current regime in the U.S. is more like a hybrid of historical cost and fair value account-
ing. For example, mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities held for salewhich constitute a
signiﬁcant portion of commercial banks' assetsare reported at the lower of cost or market value.
In this regard, this paper responds the question raised by Hemmer (2008).
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method for the regulator is direct payoﬀs.24
Lemma 6. LCM reduces the expected resolution costs relative to fair value accounting
if and only if δ > δ3.
Lemma 6 suggests that LCM reduces the regulator's costs compared to fair value
accounting when the liquidity discount 1− δ is suﬃciently low. To understand why,
depositors (or equivalently the regulator) care more about bad news because their
payoﬀ is concave in the bank's value. However, the accounting treatment for good
news still makes a diﬀerence because a healthy bank may obtain extra capital to
absorb the insolvent bank by marking its assets up. As a result, the regulator can
eliminate the ineﬃciency resulting from an illiquid market. Nonetheless, provided
that the liquidity discount is already mild, the advantage of a peer bank relative to
the secondary market becomes marginal, while the regulator still bears the costs of
contagion. As a consequent, the regulator prefers LCM if δ > δ3 as it eliminates
contagion by prohibiting the healthy bank from marking up, while still facilitates
regulatory intervention by marking the troubled bank's assets down.
The following Proposition summarizes the full comparison of three accounting
regimes:
Proposition 6. 1. The regulator prefers fair value accounting only if δ is inter-
mediate.
2. The regulator never prefers fair value accounting if marking up has net cost.
First, Figure 5 shows that for fair value accounting to dominate LCM, a peer bank
must be suﬃciently more eﬃcient relative to the secondary market, i.e., δ < δ3. At
the same time, for fair value accounting to dominate historical cost accounting, the
liquidity discount must be adequately low suggested by Proposition 5, i.e., δ > δ2.
24In an untabulated extension, I ﬁnd that the ﬁxed capital structure could be endogenized by a
small twist. Suppose that the informativeness λ is unobservable and follows a uniform distribution
in the unit interval; I ﬁnd that both banks will always raise the maximum deposits in equilibrium.
In addition, as discussed in previous section, ﬁnancial contagion can be prevented if any bank raise
extra equity. In other words, the main concern for the regulator is the case in which banks raise the
maximum deposits.
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0 δ2 δ1 δ3 1
δ
HC  FV  LCM FV  HC  LCM FV  LCM  HC LCM  FV  HC
HC dominates FV dominates LCM dominates
Figure 2.5: LCM Case 1: Net Beneﬁt
Therefore, the regulator prefers fair value accounting only when the liquidity discount
is intermediate.
0 δ3 δ1 δ2 1
δ
HC  FV  LCM LCM  FV  HCHC  LCM  FV LCM  HC  FV
HC dominates LCM dominates
Figure 2.6: LCM Case 2: Net Cost
In stark contrast, the regulator never prefers fair value accounting is never optimal
if marking up has net cost deﬁned by Proposition 3. As shown in Figure 6, the region
in which fair value accounting dominates historical cost becomes so small, i.e., δ2 is
very high. As a result, as long as δ > δ2, the advantage of a peer bank relative to
the secondary market becomes quite marginal, and LCM can further reduce total
resolution costs compared to fair value accounting. In a similar fashion, when the
liquidity discount is severe, the optimal accounting regime is historical cost as any
ineﬃcient liquidation could be prevented.
2.4 Extensions
2.4.1 Policy Implications
In this subsection, I discuss some interesting policy implications for bank regulators
and accounting standard setters.
First, the recent move from the incurred loss model to the current expected credit
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loss (CECL) model is quoted as one of the biggest changes in banks' ﬁnancial re-
porting. In fact, one of the most well-known criticisms of the incurred loss model
is the too little too late issue: The combination that the loss must be both prob-
able and reasonably estimable is rather restrictive, which often leads to delayed
loss recognition. In that regard, the CECL model removes the probable thresh-
old and requires banks to estimate the expected losses at the point when credits
are originated, and therefore redeﬁnes accounting for credit losses as measurement of
banks' risk, rather than recognition of banks' losses.25 If more information becomes
available subsequently, banks should update their estimates accordingly: Following
positive information, a healthy bank can revise its estimate up and thus obtains extra
capital, which further allows the bank to take more risk. In other words, the CECL
model comprises both marking up and marking down, similar to fair value accounting
studied in the model. Therefore, the the seemingly perfect CECL model may lead
to ﬁnancial contagion and increase bank regulators' resolution costs relative to the
incurred loss model, which is an unintended consequence and has not been discussed
before.
Corollary 2. More informative accounting may not necessarily reduce the expected
resolution costs, i.e.,
∂T CFV
∂λ
is ambiguous.
Corollary 2 suggests that accounting informativeness may hurt bank regulators
for two reasons: First, had banks always raised extra capital to prevent closure,
more informative accounting would make the regulator better oﬀ because banks will
voluntarily hold more capital. However, as accounting becomes more informative,
issuing extra equity to prevent closure becomes more costly and banks are more
inclined to raise the maximum deposits, i.e., T CFV is discontinuous at λB and λF .
Second, suppose banks raise the maximum deposits; I decompose total resolution
25Since the CECLmodel conveys a longer life of loan analysis, the risk of earnings management
especially those factors reﬂected in forecasts of the futurecould signiﬁcantly increase. This argu-
ment is consistent with one famous criticism of fair value accounting that it impairs the reliability
of accounting. For example, Beatty, Chamberlain, and Magliolo (1995) provide empirical evidence
that banks strategically change their ﬁnancial reporting to achieve primary capital, tax, and earn-
ings goals. Kilic, Lobo, Ranasinghe, and Sivaramakrishnan (2012) ﬁnd that commercial banks under
SFAS 133 rely more on loan loss provisioning to smooth earnings.
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costs as follows:
T CFV = q2[2(1− PH)DF ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
both receive H
+ (1− q)2 [2(DF − δPLR)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
both receive L
+ 2q(1− q)[DF − PLR + ECA]︸ ︷︷ ︸
one H and one L
The ﬁrst term is decreasing in λ because the information content ofH increases, which
means the healthy bank is less likely to default. Nonetheless, the second and third
term are both increasing in λ, because the information content of L also increases,
suggesting that credit deterioration becomes more severe. As a result, the salvage
value of the insolvent bank's assets decreases regardless of the resolution method.
In summary, too informative accounting may distort banks' incentives to issue extra
equity, and diminish the beneﬁt of regulatory intervention since banks' distressed
assets becomes worthless by the time of intervention.
Corollary 2 sheds light on the debate between the bank regulator and account-
ing standards setters over the goals of banks' ﬁnancial reporting. The mission of
prudential regulation is to enhance ﬁnancial stability and to reduce systemic risk,
whereas the purpose of ﬁnancial reporting is to provide decision-useful information
to existing and potential investors. These tasks often overlap, but are not the same.
However, bank regulators often criticize that some accounting standards, such as fair
value accounting, could have impaired ﬁnancial stability even though they provide
more relevant information. In response to these criticisms, Robert H Herz, the for-
mer chairman of the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB), recommended
that the setting of accounting standards and the setting of regulatory capital and re-
serves should be decoupled.26 Even though bank regulators are able to adjust GAAP
number with so-called prudential ﬁlters, banks' ﬁnancial reporting remains a crucial
factor in calculating regulatory capital. For example, the informative of accounting is
determined by the bank's measurement rules, loan loss provision models, etc., which
are determined by the FASB's accounting standards rather than bank regulators. As
26In the FASB's Conceptual Framework, they explicitly state that, the regulator's information
needs and maintaining ﬁnancial stability are not their primary objective, because Handcuﬃng
regulators to GAAP or distorting GAAP to always ﬁt the needs of regulators is inconsistent with
the diﬀerent purposes of ﬁnancial reporting and prudential regulation.
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a result, bank regulators may be better oﬀ deviating from accounting numbers. In
this simple model, I potentially ﬁnd conditions in which the mission of prudential
regulation and the objective of ﬁnancial reporting may not coincide, and thus call for
eﬀective coordination between the two parties.
Lastly, I decompose total resolution costs into two parts: The expected immediate
costs incurred at date 3 are deﬁned as short-term costs, i.e., ST . Meanwhile, the
expected future obligations that will be incurred at date 4 are deﬁned as long-term
costs, i.e., LT .
Corollary 3. ST LCM > ST FV > ST HC; LT HC > LT FV > LT LCM .
Corollary 3 links accounting measurement to myopia of bank regulators. In reality,
bank regulators may care more about short-term than long-term costs because they
are resource constrained and are concerned about maintaining the deposit insurance
fund (Gallemore, 2016). Corollary 3 suggests that fair value accounting saves short-
term costs vis-à-vis LCM, because the regulator avoids ineﬃcient liquidation with
probability 2q(1−q). Meanwhile, historical cost can further reduce short-term costs as
there is no interim costs at date 3. However, short-term beneﬁts also come with long-
term costs. Historical cost delays, rather than eliminate short-term costs, because
those insolvent institutions that could have been closed earlier are likely to fail anyway.
In that regard, LCM and fair value accounting can prevent the accumulation by
unraveling deterioration of asset quality immediately. Meanwhile, LCM can alleviate
ﬁnancial contagion and thus lead to the lowest long-term costs. Therefore, the above
results provide a plausible solution to mitigate regulatory myopia, i.e., adopting more
conservative accounting measurement regimes such as LCM.
2.4.2 Social Costs of Bank Failures
A bank failure occurs when it is unable to meet the obligations to its depositors be-
cause of insolvency or illiquidity. The literature has documented two types of costs
associated with a bank failure: the direct monetary costs paid from insurance funds
to depositors; and the nonmonetary costs incurred to the society. The social costs
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could arise because: (i) A bank failure decreases the availability of banking services,
especially to smaller communities, and thus disturbs real economic activities. (ii) De-
positors lose conﬁdence in the ﬁnancial system as a whole, leading to panic-driven
runs on other healthy institutions. (iii) A nontransferable charter is required by the
legislation for a bank to take deposits and make loans, and becomes forfeited upon
the failure. Endogenizing these social costs requires a general equilibrium model or
a coordination game among investors (Gao and Jiang, 2018; Goldstein and Sapra,
2014), which is beyond the scope of this paper. For simplicity, I assume that any
incidence of failure will impose a ﬁxed costs F on the regulator, and the expected
social costs are denoted as SC (Corona, Nan, and Zhang, 2016).
Under historical cost accounting, a bank failure only occurs at date 4 when its
investment fails, so SCHC = 2(1− q)F .
Under LCM, a bank could fail at date 3 due to insolvency, or at date 4 when its
investment fails, i.e.,
SCLCM = 2 [(1− q) + q(1− PH)]F (2.7)
Lastly, under fair value accounting, the insolvent bank's service is protected if the
conglomerate does not default at date 4. In contrast, if the conglomerate defaults,
both banks fail and their services are lost. Deﬁne Pr(Con) as the probability of
default for the conglomerate.
SCFV =
[
2(1− q)2 + 2q2(1− PH) + 2q(1− q)× 2Pr(Con)
]F (2.8)
Proposition 7. 1. Historical cost accounting always leads to the lowest social
costs.
2. Fair value accounting leads to higher social costs than LCM if and only if R <
2D and λ is intermediate.
First, historical cost always leads to lower social costs than fair value and LCM
accounting because noisy accounting signals inevitably result in type Ierror: a bank
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fails at the interim date due to insolvency even though it could have survived with-
out intervention. Second, the comparison between LCM and fair value accounting
depends on circumstances: In the coinsurance case, an interbank acquisition not only
saves the banking services of the troubled institution, but also reinforces the stability
of the healthy bank, thereby leading to positive net eﬀect. In contrast, the acquisition
protects the troubled bank's service while put excessive risk on the healthy bank's
service in the contagion case. As a result, the net eﬀect could be negative if the
λ is smaller and suﬃciently close to 1 − R−DF
qR
, i.e., when the informativeness of
accounting is intermediate.
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Conclusion
3.1 Discussion
3.1.1 Marking up in Practice
The interaction between fair value accounting and ﬁnancial contagion has received
much attention by accounting researchers in the last decade. The empirical evidence,
however, remains mixed. For example, Bhat, Frankel, and Martin (2011) and Khan
(2010) ﬁnd supporting evidence that fair value accounting is associated with an in-
crease in contagion among banks. Laux and Leuz (2009, 2010) and Xie (2016) ﬁnd no
evidence that fair value accounting has contributed to the ﬁnancial crisis in 2007. A
typical argument is that many types of banks' assets are not recorded at the fair value;
in addition, for certain types of assets that are recorded at fair value, unrealized gains
or losses will directly enter other comprehensive income and thus have no impact on
regulatory capital (Laux and Leuz, 2009, 2010). Since the main contribution of this
paper is the novel trade-oﬀ of marking up, the following question would naturally
arise: Does marking up exist under current accounting standards?
The answer is positive and I will give two examples. First, banks hold a large
amount of investment securities classiﬁed as held to maturity, available for sale or
trading assets. In practice, held to maturity securities are measured at historical cost
while the other two categories are measured at fair value; furthermore, unrealized
gains or losses for trading assets will directly aﬀect banks' net income and conse-
quently regulatory capital. As for large banks, trading assets constitute around 8% of
their total assets, which are economically signiﬁcant. Second, fair value option (ASU
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Subtopic 825-10 or IAS 39) allows business entities to elect to measure most ﬁnancial
instruments and many other items at fair value. Subsequently, unrealized gains and
losses on items for which the fair value option has been elected are reported in net
income. In reality, fair value option is not widely used by banks possibly because
it leads to excessive volatility of earnings or because banks face competition in the
deposit market (Corona et al., 2017). Nevertheless, the economic consequence could
have been huge had banks chosen to use fair value option for all assets and liabilities.
More importantly, accounting has recently moved towards more fair value based,
for example, the change of loan loss provision models, therefore marking up may
become more prevalent in the future. In that regard, my results imply that marking
up can lead to signiﬁcant losses for bank regulators, which has not been shown in
prior literature.
3.1.2 Regulation and Commitment
A crucial assumption in the model is that prudential regulation entails regulators'
commitment to intervene with troubled banks. In this section, I justify this assump-
tion from several perspectives.
First, there is a time inconsistency issue with respect to commitment: Even though
commitment seems ineﬃcient ex post, it could be optimal from an ex ante standpoint
because banks' capital structure decisions become diﬀerent without commitment. The
issue of time inconsistency is a common feature in other studies on policy making and
accounting standards setting. For example, Arya and Glover (2006) ﬁnd a principal's
ex post optimal bailout policy can decrease the incentive of agents to exert eﬀort
ex ante. I only discuss a special case in the text and leave detailed proofs to Ap-
pendix B. Suppose the regulator lacks commitment power and forbearance is ex post
optimal for any signal realization; in return, banks will anticipate the regulator's se-
quential rationality and thus always raise the maximum deposits. Therefore, the lack
of commitment can dampen the disciplinary eﬀect resulting from marking down.
Second, managers of distressed banks have incentives to take a gambling for res-
urrection strategy without intervention, because downside risk is completely borne
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by depositors. This moral hazard issue has been broadly studied in the literature
(Corona et al., 2017, 2014; Lu et al., 2016); one notorious example is the S&L crisis
in the 1980s. Due to lack of regulatory supervision and virtually nonexistent market
discipline, many insolvent institutions adopted go-for-broke strategies or took fraud-
ulent practices, such as absconding money from the bank. Widespread malpractices
ﬁnally led to catastrophic losses, which could have been reduced had regulators closed
the insolvent thrifts.
Third, the bank regulator faces reputation losses and market monitoring. In a
dynamic world, forbearing troubled banks impairs the regulator's reputation because
banks believe the regulator is likely lenient. As a response, banks will engage in
more intensive risk taking. In addition, since the bank's insolvency status is publicly
observable, the regulator will face great pressure from the public for failing to fulﬁll
its obligation.
Lastly, other mechanisms also exist in reality to ensure the commitment: (i) For-
mal interventions, such as enforcement actions, are always legally enforceable. As a
result, unsound banks are subject to supervision by a prudential regulator. (ii) The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 requires the regu-
lator to take prompt corrective actions (PCA) when the depository institutions are
critically undercapitalized: the objective of PCA is to restrict the regulator's ability
to delay intervention. (iii) Various public disclosures, such as banks' ﬁnancial state-
ments, call reports, etc., increase bank's transparency and make it more diﬃcult for
the regulator to exercise forbearance. For example, Gallemore (2016) ﬁnds that bank
ﬁnancial reporting opacity, measured by delayed loan loss recognition, is negatively
associated with regulatory intervention. Furthermore, the association is not driven
by opacity that inhibits the eﬀectiveness of monitoring, but driven by providing an
information environment within which to practice forbearance.
3.1.3 Capital Regulation
Under current capital regulation in the U.S., there are ﬁve levels of capital adequacy:
a bank is (i) well capitalized if the capital ratio is above 8%; (ii) adequately capitalized
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if above 6%; (iii) undercapitalized if below 6%; (iv) signiﬁcantly undercapitalized if
below 4%; (v) critically undercapitalized if below 2%. For simplicity, I assume banks
do not incur monetary costs when they are undercapitalized but not critically under-
capitalized (2%-6%). In reality, banks that fail to meet minimum capital requirement
are subject to regulatory scrutiny, such as cease and desist orders. In addition, banks'
operations are also restricted until the problem is solved; for example, banks must
reduce asset growth, increase earnings retention, etc. Because of these restrictions,
banks' proﬁt will decline signiﬁcantly, even though they may still be able to continue
to operate. In that regard, a possible extension of this model is to include partial
liquidation, but the main trade-oﬀ should not change.
More importantly, one caveat of this paper is that the exogenous prudential reg-
ulation cannot be justiﬁed within the model. Nevertheless, I will separately discuss
how bank closure and minimum capital requirement become optimal by adding some
more components in the model.
First, any bank closure before asset maturity decreases social surplus because
outsiders are always less ineﬃcient in generating proﬁts. In other words, from the
social planer's perspective, depositors (or equivalently the regulator) should never
have the decision right as they are too keen to liquidate. Nevertheless, this argument
does not hold if banks also face the moral hazard problem described in Section 6.2
(Lu et al., 2016). Speciﬁcally, if insolvent banks are allowed to continue, managers'
gamble for resurrection strategy can further aggravate welfare losses, suggesting
that bank closure is also optimal for the social planer.
In addition, the FDIC, who aims to reduce expected resolution costs, is delegated
as the bank regulator in my model. However, why banks are not required to be more,
or even completely equity ﬁnanced if that is the only objective for the regulator? The
answer is unfortunately outside of the model: bank regulators, such as the Federal
Reserve and the Oﬃce of Currency and Comptroller, have other missions than to re-
duce resolution costs. For example, banks can provide liquid, information-insensitive
securities such as demand deposits that are valuable to investors. Gorton and Winton
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(2017) build a general equilibrium model and ﬁnd that raising the capital require-
ment reduces short-term debts, because the equity holders will substitute for debt
holders. Dang, Gorton, Holmström, and Ordonez (2017) ﬁnd that banks keep the
details of their loans secret to produce safe and money-like liquidity. Furthermore,
the minimum capital requirement is converging to a uniform standard globally, pri-
marily designated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and even bank
regulators such as the FDIC have limited discretion in determining φ. Therefore,
the optimal minimum capital requirement will be interior after taking into account
liquidity provision role, which is also consistent with reality.
3.2 Concluding Remarks
At the center of criticism of fair value accounting is the vicious circle of falling prices
during recessions, and how it leads to ﬁnancial contagion and, in turn, destabilizes
the economy. The basis for this argument is that when the market is illiquid and
distressed, marking down to such an ineﬃcient market could result in more failures
of otherwise healthy institutions. In this paper, I deviate from the prior literature
and focus on the costs and beneﬁts of marking up.
I develop a simple model to examine how fair value accounting can lead to ﬁnancial
contagion and thus increase resolution costs for the bank regulator. By forcing banks
to mark assets down, the regulator obtains an early signal of credit deterioration to
take early intervention, thereby preventing further damages. Meanwhile, by marking
its assets up, a healthy bank obtains additional free capital to absorb a failed bank,
which is also a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the regulator avoids liquidating
the failed bank's assets in a less eﬃcient secondary market, and thus saves resolution
costs. On the other hand, the acquisition may also impose excessive default risk
on the otherwise healthy bank and leads to contagion. Therefore, the net eﬀect of
marking up is unclear. I ﬁnd that marking up increases overall resolution costs when
banks' investments are less proﬁtable, banks are highly leveraged and accounting
signal is not adequately informative. As a remedy, lower of cost or market accounting
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can prevent ﬁnancial contagion, because it forbids a healthy bank from obtaining
capital through marking up. Therefore, the healthy bank must raise external equity
to acquire the troubled bank, which protects depositors and reduces resolution costs.
After introducing LCM, I ﬁnd that the regulator prefers fair value accounting only
when the liquidity discount in the secondary market is intermediate.
In addition, this paper also provide interesting policy implications. I ﬁnd that
more informative accounting information not only distorts banks' incentives to raise
more equity, but may also diminish the value of regulatory intervention. As a result,
bank regulators may prefer less informative but potentially more timely information,
which helps to explain the debate over the objective of ﬁnancial reporting between
bank regulators and accounting standard setters. Finally, contrary to the popular
view that the CECL model strictly dominates the incurred loss model, I ﬁnd that
ﬁnancial contagion may emerge after introducing and CECL model and bank regula-
tors' resolution costs may increase.
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Appendix A
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. If accounting is not informative, i.e., λ < 1− DF
qR
.
= λC , the bank will choose
DB = DF .
If accounting is suﬃciently informative and D > PLR, the expected payoﬀ is
qPH(R−D)−(I−D). Since it is strictly increasing in D, the bank chooses DB = DF .
If D < PLR, the expected payoﬀ is q(R −D)− (I −D). Since it is increasing in D,
the bank chooses DB = PLR. So the bank's problem becomes
max
D={DF ,PLR}
ΠB(D) =
qPH(R−DF )− (I −DF ) if D = DFq(R− PLR)− (I − PLR) if D = PLR
Therefore, the bank chooses DB = PLR if and only if
qPH(R−DF )− (I −DF ) < q(R− PLR)− (I − PLR)⇔ λ < 1− DF
2qR− qDF
Denote the RHS as λB. I have
⇒ DB =
PLR if λC < λ < λBDF otherwise
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Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. I prove that the capital ratio after the acquisition is above φ.
EHi
PHR + PLR
=
PHR−Di
PHR + PLR
≥ φ
⇔ (1− φ)PHR− φPLR ≥ Di
The LHS is strictly increasing in λ, and the minimum must be reached at λ = 1−Dj
qR
,
which leads to
⇔ q(1− φ)R > qDi +Dj(2qφ− q + φ+ 1)
The RHS is strictly increasing in Di and Dj, so a suﬃcient condition is that when
Di = Dj = (1− φ)I, the above inequality still holds.
⇔ φ < qR− I
(2q − 1)I
By assumption that φ < φ¯, the above inequality always holds.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. I only need to prove ∆M > PH(R−Di).
PHPL(2R− PLR−Di) + (PH + PL − 2PHPL)max{0, R− PLR−Di}
> PH(R−Di)
⇔ PH(1− PL)(PLR−R +Di) + (PH + PL − 2PHPL)max{0, R− PLR−Di} > 0
(i) If R− PLR−Di < 0, the above inequality ⇔ PH(1− PL)(PLR−R+Di) > 0.
(ii) If R−PLR−Di ≥ 0, the above inequality ⇔ 2PL(PH − 1)(PLR−R+Di) > 0.
Therefore, the healthy bank is always better oﬀ after acquiring the insolvent bank.
Proof of Lemma 5
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Proof. Bank i chooses the maximum deposits if and only if the following inequality
is satisﬁed.
ΠM1 (DF , Dˆj) > Π
M
2 (PLR, Dˆj) (A.1)
DF + q
2PH(R−DF )− [(1− q)PL + q2PH ](R− PLR)− PLR
−q(1− q)(∆M(PLR)−∆M(DF )) > 0
The objective is to show that equation (A.1) increases in λ. By equation (1.3), we
also have
∆M(DF ) = PHPL(2R− PLR−DF ) + (PH + PL − 2PHPL) max{R− PLR−DF , 0}
∆M(PLR) = PHPL(2R− 2PLR) + (PH + PL − 2PHPL) max{R− 2PLR, 0}
Case 1: R > 2DF . In this case, the intermediate return is always positive, so
∆M(PLR)−∆M(DF ) = PHPL(DF − PLR) + (PH + PL − 2PHPL)(DF − PLR) which
is equal to
(1− q)
{
(λ− 1)qR ((1− λ)2(q3 − q2) + 2)+DF ((1− λ)2(q3 − q2)− λq + q + 1)}
Deﬁne the equation as G1(λ)⇒
G
′
1(λ) = q(1− q)
[
DF
(
2(λ− 1)(q2 − q)− 1) +R(3(λ− 1)2(q3 − q2) + 2) ]
> q(1− q)[R
2
(
2(λ− 1)(q2 − q)− 1) +R(3(λ− 1)2(q3 − q2) + 2) ]
=
q(1− q)R
2
[
6(λ− 1)2q3 − 2 (3λ2 − 7λ+ 4) q2 − 2(λ− 1)q + 3] > 0
Therefore, G1(λ) is strictly increasing in λ, and Dˆj > PLR⇒ 1 > λ > 1− Dˆj
qR
> λC .
Now I just need to check the two corners: When λ → 1, G1(1) → (1 − q)DF > 0;
when λ → λC , G1(λC) → (1− q)DF (DF −R)
R
< 0. So there exists a λF ∈ (λC , 1),
such that G1(λ) > 0 if and only if λ > λF .
Case 2: R < 2DF . In this case, the intermediate return could be negative.
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(i) If R − PLR < PLR ⇒ ∆M(PLR) − ∆M(DF ) = PHPL(DF − PLR). Equation
(A.1) is equivalent to
ΠM1 (DF , Dˆj)− ΠM2 (PLR, Dˆj) = G1(λ) + (PH + PL − 2PHPL)(DF − PLR)
Deﬁne this equation as G2(λ). Because both PH + PL− 2PHPL and DF − PLR
are strictly increasing in λ, G
′
2(λ) > 0. In addition, when λ → λC , G2(λC) →
DF (1− q)2(DF −R)
R
< 0.
(ii) If R−DF < PLR < R− PLR⇒ ∆M(PLR)−∆M(DF ) = PHPL(DF − PLR) +
(PH + PL − 2PHPL)(R− 2PLR). Equation (A.1) is equivalent to
ΠM1 (DF , Dˆj)− ΠM2 (PLR, Dˆj) = G1(λ) + (PH + PL − 2PHPL)(R− PLR−DF )
Deﬁne the equation as G3(λ). Since (PH + PL − 2PHPL) and (R− PLR−DF )
are both increasing in λ, G
′
3(λ) > 0. In addition, when λ→ λB, G3(λB) > 0.
(iii) If PLR > R− PLR, we are back to case 1, and when λ→ 1, G1(1) > 0.
Therefore, ΠM1 (DF ) − ΠM2 (PLR) is increasing in λ. When λ → λC ,ΠM1 (DF ) <
ΠM2 (PLR), when λ → 1,ΠM1 (DF ) > ΠM2 (PLR). Therefore, there exists a threshold
λF such such that ΠM1 (DF ) > Π
M
2 (PLR) if and only if λ > λF .
Next I compare the two thresholds λB and λF .
G1(λB) =
(DF )
3(1− q)(R−DF )
(DF − 2R)3 < 0
G2(λB) =
2DF (1− q)(R−DF )2(2qR−DF )
(2R−DF )3 > 0
To simplify notation, I deﬁne
R
DF
.
= α.
1. If α ≥ 2, because G1(λB) < G1(λF ) = 0⇒ λB < λF .
2. If α < 2 and λB is such that R − DF > PLR, i.e., 1 − 4α + 2α2 > 0, for the
same reason above, we have λB < λF . The inequality of α is equivalent to
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α >
2 +
√
2
2
.
3. If α < 2 and λB is such that λB < 1 − 1
2q
, i.e., α <
3
2
, we have G2(λB) >
G1(λF ) = 0⇒ λB > λF .
4. If α < 2 and λB is such that R−DF < PLR < R−PLR, i.e., 3
2
< α <
2 +
√
2
2
,
we have G3(λB) ∝ −8α4q + 4α3(6q + 1) − 2α2(9q + 7) + α(q + 13) − 2. After
some algebra, I ﬁnd that the RHS is strictly decreasing in α. When α→ 3
2
, the
RHS equals
(3q − 1)
2
> 0; when α → 2 +
√
2
2
, the RHS equals −(1− q)√
2
< 0.
So there exists a threshold α∗1, such that G3(λB) < 0 if and only if α > α
∗
1.
In summary, λB < λF if and only if α > α∗1.
The comparative statics are straightforward by the implicit function theorem.
Suppose Gk(λF ) = 0 and k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
dλF
dα
= −
(
∂Gk(λ)
∂α
)/(∂Gk(λ)
∂λ
)
> 0
Lastly, I rule out the strategy of raising extra capital to be able to acquire j even
if Yi = L. To achieve that goal, bank i needs to further lower its leverage such that
Di ≤ PLR− 2φPLR .= DS. The expected payoﬀ is
ΠM3 (Di) = q
2(R−Di)︸ ︷︷ ︸
j receives H
+ q(1− q)∆M(Di)︸ ︷︷ ︸
i receives H, j receives L
+ (1− q)2∆M1 (Di)︸ ︷︷ ︸
i receives L, j receives L
−(I −Di)
where ∆M1 (Di) = (PL)
2(2R −Di − PLR) + 2PL(1 − PL) max{(R −Di − PLR), 0}. I
prove that ΠM3 (DS) < Π
M
2 (PLR) as long as φ < φ¯.
ΠM2 (PLR)− ΠM3 (DS) = [(1− q)PL + q2PH ](R− PLR) + 2φPLR− q2(R−DS)
−q(1− q)(∆M(DS)−∆M(PLR))− (1− q)2∆M1 (DS)
= (1− q2)(2φPLR) + (1− q)2(PL(R− PLR)−∆M1 (DS))
−q(1− q)(∆M(DS)−∆M(PLR))
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Since ∆M1 (DS) − PL(R − PLR) > 0 and ∆M(DS) − ∆M(PLR) > 0, I only need to
prove the inequality when both terms reach the maximum, i.e., if R > 2PLR. In this
case,
ΠM2 (PLR)− ΠM3 (DS) ∝ −λ(3− 2φ)− 2(λ− 1)2q3 + (λ− 1)q2(4λ+ 2φ− 7)
−q (2λ2 + 2λ(2φ− 5)− 4φ+ 9)− 4φ+ 5 .= G4(λ)
⇒ G′4(λ) ∝ −(1− q)2(4(λ− 1)q − 2φ+ 3) < 0
⇒ G4(λ) > G4(1) = 2− q − 2φ > 0
Therefore, bank i will never choose DS in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Case 1: λF > λB. If λ > λF , it is a dominant strategy to choose the maximum
deposits regardless of the conjecture. If λ < λB, it is a dominant strategy to issue
extra equity. However, if λB < λ < λF , suppose bank i believes Dˆj = DF , the optimal
capital structure is Di = PLR. On the other hand, given bank j believes Dˆi = PLR,
the best response is Dj = DF . Therefore, the conjecture is consistent with the actual
decisions for both i and j, suggesting the rational expectation condition is satisﬁed.
Alternatively, suppose bank i believes Dˆj = PLR, Di = DF , it is optimal for bank j
to choose Dj = PLR.
Case 2: λF < λB. In a similar fashion, if λ > λB, the dominant strategy is
D = DF , and if λ < λF , the dominant strategy is D = PLR. If λF < λ < λB,
suppose bank i believes Dˆj = DF , it will choose Di = DF , which in turn supports
Dj = DF for bank j given rational expectation. Nonetheless, suppose bank i believes
Dˆj = PLR, the best response is Di = PLR, which in turn supports Dj = PLR given
rational expectation.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. When both banks receive L, the regulator prefers to intervene if and only if
2(1− PL)DF > 2(DF − δPLR)⇔ δ > DF
R
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Therefore, marking downs leads to net beneﬁt if and only if δ >
DF
R
.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Assume bank i acquires bank j so the balance sheet after acquisition becomes:
PHR + PLR︸ ︷︷ ︸
Investments
+Dj − PLR︸ ︷︷ ︸
Subsidy
= Di +Dj︸ ︷︷ ︸
All deposits
+Ei + (PHR− I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Capital
which is equivalent to bank i absorbing only a proportion of depositors and the rest
being directly paid oﬀ by the regulator.
PHR + PLR︸ ︷︷ ︸
Total ssets
= D + PLR︸ ︷︷ ︸
Proportion of deposits
+E + (PHR− I)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Capital
Obviously, D − PLR < (1 − PL)DF , so marking up reduces costs of resolving the
insolvent bank. However, ECA > (1 − PL)(1 − PH)(D + PLR) > (1 − PH)DF ,
marking up increases costs of resolving the healthy bank after the acquisition.
To understand the overall eﬀect, I further decompose total resolution costs. In
the coinsurance case
DF − PLR︸ ︷︷ ︸
resolving insolvent bank
+ (1− PL)(1− PH)PLR︸ ︷︷ ︸
absorbed depositors in the healthy bank
+ (1− PL)(1− PH)DF︸ ︷︷ ︸
original depositors in the healthy bank
It is obvious that the original depositors face less risk, i.e., (1 − PL)(1 − PH)DF <
(1− PH)DF . In addition, combine unabsorbed and absorbed depositors and we have
DF − PLR + (1− PL)(1− PH)PLR < (1− PL)DF
⇔ (PH + PL − PHPL)R > DF
In other words, all depositors including the original depositors face less risk after the
acquisition and the overall eﬀect must be positive.
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However, in the contagion case, ECA can be decomposed as follows
(1− PL)(1− PH)PLR + (PH + PL − 2PHPL)(DF + PLR−R) PLR
PLR +DF︸ ︷︷ ︸
absorbed depositors in the healthy bank
+ (1− PL)(1− PH)DF + (PH + PL − 2PHPL)(DF + PLR−R) DF
PLR +DF︸ ︷︷ ︸
original depositors in the healthy bank
In this equation, suppose only one investment succeeds, the shortfall to pay oﬀ de-
positors is PLR+DF −R and the original depositors need a proportion DF
PLR +DF
.
We can show that under certain conditions, costs of protecting original depositors is
higher than (1− PH)DF because of the acquisition.
In the next step, I formally prove part two of Proposition 4. Marking up decreases
overall costs if and only if
(1− PL − PH)DF + PLR > ECA (A.2)
where ECA = (1− PH)(1− PL)(DF + PLR) + (PL + PH − 2PLPH)(DF + PLR − R)
in the contagion case.
⇔ (PL + PH − 2PLPH + PH(PL)2)R > (PL + PH − PLPH)DF
⇔ α [λ+ (1− λ)3q3 + (λ− 2)(1− λ)2q2 + 2(1− λ)2q]
− [(1− λ)2q2 − (λ2 − 3λ+ 2) q − λ] > 0
Deﬁne the above as F1(λ)⇒ F ′′1 (λ) = 2q (2α + 3α(1− λ)q2 + q(α(3λ− 4) + 1)− 1),
which is increasing in λ. When λ→ λC = 1− 1
qα
, F
′′
1 (λC)→ 2q(2α−(α−4)q−4) > 0.
Therefore, F1(λ) is a convex function in λ, and F
′
1(λ) is increasing in λ.
F
′
1(λC) = α +
5− 5q
α
+ 3q − 5 < 0
F
′
1(1−
α− 1
qα
) = −α + (α
2 − 3α + 1) q − 1
α
.
= F2(α, q)
(i) If F2(α, q) < 0, then F1(λ) is strictly decreasing in λ, and F1(λ) > F1(1 −
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α− 1
qα
) = α +
1
α
− 2 > 0. So the regulator prefers to intervene for all λ.
(ii) If F2(α, q) > 0, F1(λ) is ﬁrst decreasing and then increasing in λ, and the
minimum value is reached at F
′
1(λ) = 0. Since F
′
1(λ) is a quadratic function, I
can get the analytical solution µ as follows. If the minimum value F1(µ) > 0,
F1(λ) > F1(µ) > 0. If instead F1(µ) < 0, for λ in a particular region, F1(λ) < 0.
µ =
3αq3 + (1− 4α)q2 + (2α− 1)q − q√(α2 − α + (α2 + α + 1) q2 − (α2 + 2) q + 1)
3α(q − 1)q2
Now I just need to solve F1(µ) < 0, which involves some tedious algebra. The ﬁrst
step is to show that F1(µ) is strictly increasing in α; next, when α reaches its minimum
at
1
q
, F1(µ) < 0⇔ q > q∗1, in other words, a necessary condition for F1(µ) < 0 is that
q > q∗1; ﬁnally, when q > q
∗
1, denote α
∗
2 as the solution for F1(µ) = 0, so a necessary
condition for F1(µ) < 0 is that ⇒ α < α∗2.
In summary, upon observing H and L, the regulator prefers not to intervene if
and only if q > q∗1, α < α
∗
2, and λ
∗(α, q) < λ < λ∗∗(α, q).1
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. First, I study the case in which only one bank chooses the partial capital
structure. Without loss of generality, I assume bank i raises DF and j raises PLR.
Since bank j issues extra equity, only bank i will be closed at L. If bank j receives
L as well, it will be under regulatory scrutiny although not yet intervened, and a
deposit payoﬀ is the only resolution method. However, if bank j receives H, it will
acquire i. The following table presents the expected resolution costs conditional on
signal realization.
Table A.1: Expected Costs When Only One Bank Raise Extra Equity
1The analytical solutions are obtained by solving polynomial equations. Speciﬁcally, q∗1 is the
third root of 4− 43x+ 138x2 − 195x3 + 122x4 − 18x5 − 12x6 + 5x7 = 0, and q∗1 ≈ 0.769; and α∗2 is
the second root of −1 + 8q− 18q2 + 16q3 − 5q4 + (2− 14q+ 18q2 − 2q3 − 4q4)x+ (−1− 2q+ 57q2 −
92q3 + 38q4)x2 + (12q− 90q2 + 130q3− 56q4)x3 + (−4q+ 32q2− 48q3 + 23q4)x4 = 0. Lastly λ∗(α, q)
and λ∗∗(α, q) are the second and third root of
(
αq3 − αq2)x3 + (−3αq3 + 4αq2 − q2 − 2αq+ q)x2 +
(−α+ 3αq3− 5αq2 + 2q2 + 4αq− 3q+ 1)x−αq3 + 2αq2− q2− 2αq+ 2q = 0. Furthermore, it is easy
to verify that λB < λ
∗∗(α, q) so the problem is not trivial.
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Y˜i, Y˜j Probability FV: E(ĈI |{Y˜i, Y˜j})
H,H q2 (1− PH)(DF + PLR)
H,L q(1− q) (1− PH)DF + (1− PL)PLR
L,H q(1− q) (DF − PLR) + ECB
L,L (1− q)2 (DF − δPLR) + (1− PL)PLR
where ECB represents the expected resolution cost for the conglomerate, and ECB =
(1 − PH)(1 − PL)(2PLR) + (PH + PL − 2PHPL) max{2PLR − R, 0}. Therefore, the
regulator prefers fair value to historical cost accounting if and only if
2(1− q)DF −
{
q2(1− PH)(DF + PLR) + q(1− q)[(1− PH)DF + (1− PL)PLR]
+q(1− q)[(DF − PLR) + ECB] + (1− q)2[(DF − δPLR) + (1− PL)PLR]
}
> 0
DF (1− (1− λ)q)− q(ECB + (1− λ)(1− q)R(1 + (λ− 1)q − δ)) > 0
From Proposition 1, a necessary (but not suﬃcient) condition for λF > λB is that
α >
3
2
, i.e., 2PLR−R < 0. So ECB = (1− PH)(1− PL)(2PLR), and the term in the
curly bracket becomes∝ (1−λ)(1−q)αq[δ+2(λ−1)2q2+(λ−1)q−1]+λq−q+1 .= F2(λ)
⇒ F ′′2 (λ) = 2α(1− q)q
[
6(1− λ)q2 − q] > 0
⇒ F ′2(λ) > F
′
2(λC) ∝ α2(1− δ) + 3α + q
(
α2(δ − 1)− 2α + 6)− 6
> (2α− 3)(1− q) + α + 3q − 3 > 0
So F2(λ) is strictly increasing in λ. In addition,
F2(λC) =
α2δ − 2α + q [α2(1− δ) + α− 2] + 2
α2
>
(α− 1)[(α + 2)q − 2]
α2
> 0
which suggests that ⇒ F2(λ) > 0. Therefore, the regulator prefers fair value to
historical cost accounting in the presence of partial disciplinary eﬀect.
Next, I examine the case in which both banks choose the maximum deposits. Fair
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value accounting reduces expected resolution costs if and only if
(1− q)2[2(DF − δR)]PL − 2q(1− q)[(1− PL − PH)DF + PLR− ECA] < 0
Obviously this LHS is decreasing in δ, so there exists a threshold δ2 such that the
inequality is satisﬁed if and only if δ > δ2, i.e., T CFV < T CHC ⇔ δ > δ2. Apparently,
∂δ2
∂α
< 0 but
∂δ2
∂λ
is unclear.
(i) If R ≥ DF + PLR⇒
δ2 =
λq − q + 1− (λ− 1)q2 + α [(λ− 1)2q3 − (λ− 2)(λ− 1)q2 − λq]
α(1− q)
⇒ ∂δ2
∂λ
∝ α(2(1− λ)q − 1) + 1
So
∂δ2
∂λ
< 0⇔ λ > 1− α− 1
2qα
.
(ii) If R < DF + PLR⇒
δ2 =
1 + (q − q2)(1− λ)2 + [q(1− λ)2((λ− 1)q2 − (λ− 2)q − 2)− λ]
α(1− q)(1− λ)
⇒ ∂δ2
∂λ
∝ 1−α+2α(1−λ)3q3+(1−λ)2q2(α(2λ−3)+1)+(2α−1)(λ−1)2q and I denote
this equation as F3(λ). It is easy to show that F
′
3(λ) ∝ 1−2α+3α(λ−1)q2 +q(α(4−
3λ)− 1) < 0. So F3(λ) is decreasing in λ, when λ→ 1− R−DF
qR
, F3(λ) ∝ α− 2αq+
q−1 < 0. When λ→ λB, F3(λB) ∝ 4α2−6α−2 (4α4 − 10α3 + 10α2 − 6α + 1) q+ 1,
and the sign is ambiguous.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. First, since there is no acquisition under LCM, the total costs T CLCM are
equal to
(1− q)2 [2(DF − δPLR)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
both receive L
+ 2q(1− q)[(2− PH)DF − δPLR]︸ ︷︷ ︸
one H and one L
+ q2[2(1− PH)DF ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
both receive H
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Apparently, T CHC > T CLCM ⇔ δ > δ1, and I just need to compare LCM with fair
value accounting.
NCFV > NCLCM ⇔ PLR− ECA + (1− PH)DF < δPLR
The inequality is more likely to satisfy with a large δ. Meanwhile, when δ → 1, we
have NCFV > NCLCM , because ECA > (1 − PH)DF ; while when δ → 0, we have
NCFV < NCLCM , because PLR − ECA + (1− PH)DF > 0. So there exists a unique
0 < δ3 < 1, such that NCFV > NCLCM if and only if δ > δ3.
At last, I rank the order of δ1, δ2 and δ3.
(1− q)δ2 + qδ3 = δ1
From the proof of Proposition 4, we know that
δ2 > δ1 ⇔ PLR + (1− PH − PL)D < ECA ⇔ marking up leads to overall costs
The rest of the proof is in the text.
Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. If Di = Dj = PLR, T CFV = 2(1− q)PLR, which is strictly decreasing in λ. If
one bank chooses DF and the other chooses PLR, by Proposition 4,
2(1− q)DF − T CFV = (1− q)DF × F3(λ)⇒ ∂T CFV
∂λ
= −(1− q)DF × F ′3(λ) < 0
Therefore, in each of the intervals in which banks are at least partially disciplined,
more informative accounting reduces the expected resolution costs. However, the
result is diﬀerent when banks raise the maximum deposits.
(i) If R > DF +PLR⇒ T CFV = 2(1−q)DF
{
(1−λ)2(q−1)q2−λq+q+1+qα(1−
λ)[(λ−1)2q3−(λ2 − 3λ+ 2) q2+q(δ−λ)−δ]}⇒ ∂T CFV
∂λ
∝ 2(λ−1)q2−2λq+2q−
1 + α[δ− 3(λ− 1)2q3 + (3λ2 − 8λ+ 5) q2 − q(δ− 2λ+ 1)]. Denote the equation
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as F4(α) and it is easy to show that F4(α) is increasing in δ. When δ → 1,
F
′
4(α) > 0. Therefore, F4(α) > F4(
1
q
) ∝ (3λ2 − 8λ+ 5) q2 + 2(λ− 1)q + 1 > 0.
(ii) Similarly, if R < DF + PLR, I just need to show that the additional costs
F5(λ)
.
= q(1 − q)(PH + PL − 2PHPL)(DF + PLR − R) is also increasing in λ.
To see that, ⇒ F ′′5 (λ) ∝ 2q + α (6(1− λ)q2 + 6(λ− 1)q + 1) > 0. Therefore,
F
′
5(λ) > F
′
5(λC) ∝ (α2 + 3α− 16) q + 6− 2α− (α2 − 10) q2 > 0.
In sum, if both banks choose DF , and δ is suﬃciently large, T CFV is increasing in λ.
Lastly, I show how each component in ECA changes with λ. First, it is obvious
that 2(1 − PH)DF is decreasing in λ and DF − δPLR is increasing in λ. Now I just
examine the last term R > DF + PLR.
(i) Suppose R > DF + PLR, denote DF − PLR + ECA as F6(λ) ⇒ F6(λ) =
(1 − λ)(1 − q)(λq + 1 − q)(λqR − qR − DF ) + DF − (1 − λ)qR. So F ′6(λ) =
DF (q − 1)(2qλ− 2q + 1) + qR[2λ− 3(1− λ)2q2 + (3λ2 − 8λ+ 5) q − 1] > 0.
(ii) Similarly, if R < DF + PLR, DF − PLR + ECA is also increasing in λ, because
the additional term F5(λ) is increasing in λ.
Proof of Corollary 3
Proof. First, I decompose total costs into short-term and long-term costs.
ST FV = (1− q)2 [2(DF − δPLR)] + 2q(1− q)(DF − PLR)
ST LCM = (1− q)2 [2(DF − δPLR)] + 2q(1− q)(DF − δPLR)
Apparently, ST LCM − ST FV = 2q(1 − q)(1 − δ)PLR > 0. In addition, to compare
long-term costs,
LT HC − LT LCM = 2q(1− q)(1− PL)DF + (1− q)2(2(1− PL)DF ) > 0
LT FV − LT LCM = 2q(1− q) [ECA − (1− PH)DF ]
LT HC − LT FV = 2q(1− q)((2− PL − PH)DF − ECA) + (1− q)2(2(1− PL)DF )
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(i) If R > DF + PLR
ECA − (1− PH)DF = (1− PH)PL[(1− PL)R−DF ] > 0
(2− PL − PH)DF − ECA > (1− PHPL)DF − (1− PH)(1− PL)DF > 0
(ii) If R < DF + PLR
ECA − (1− PH)DF = (PH − PHPL)DF + (1− PH)(1− PL)PLR > 0
(2− PL − PH)DF − ECA = (1− PL)(1− PH)DF + PH(P 2L + 1− 2PL)R > 0
In summary, ST HC < ST FV < ST LCM , LT LCM < LT FV < LT HC .
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Apparently, the social costs are the lowest under historical costs accounting.
In addition,
SCLCM − SCFV = 2q(1− q)[2− PH − 2Pr(Con)]F
(i) If R > PLR + DF . Pr(Con) = (1 − PH)(1 − PL) ⇒ SCLCM − SCFV = 2q(1 −
q)(PH + 2PL − 2PHPL) > 0.
(ii) If R < PLR+DF . Pr(Con) = 1−PHPL ⇒ SCLCM−SCFV = 2q(1−q)PH(2PL−
1). Since 2PL−1 is strictly decreasing in λ, when λ→ λC , 2PL−1 = 2DF
R
−1 >
0; when λ → 1 − R−DF
qR
, 2PL − 1 = 1 − 2DF
R
< 0. Therefore, there exists a
λBF = 1− 1
2q
such that, SCLCM < SCFV if and only if 1− R−DF
qR
> λ > λBF .
Therefore, fair value accounting leads to higher social costs than LCM if and only if
R < 2DF and λBF < λ < 1− R−DF
qR
.
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A.2 Robustness
A.2.1 Commitment: Time Inconsistency
In this section, I prove that the bank will change its capital structure accordingly if
there is no commitment of intervention. For simplicity, I only consider a particular
set of parameters, that is q is suﬃciently large and α is suﬃciently small.2
Case 1 : δ > δ1 and λ∗ < λ < λ∗∗. The regulator intervenes only when both banks
receives L. In response, the bank faces the following problem:
max
D={DF ,PLR}
Π1(D) =
[qPH + q(1− q)PL](R−DF )− (I −DF ]) if D = DFq(R− PLR)− (I − PLR) if D = PLR
⇒ D1 =
DF if λ > λ1PLR if λ < λ1
where λ1 = 1 − DF
q(2R−DF + qDF − qR) . It is easy to verify that λ1 < λB and
λ1 < λ
∗ so the equilibrium is sustained in λ∗ < λ < λ∗∗.
Case 2 : δ > δ1 and λ is either greater than λ∗∗ or less than λ∗, it is optimal to
close the insolvent bank regardless of the resolution method. Therefore, the bank
chooses the maximum deposits when λ > λ∗, and issues extra equity when λ < λ∗.
Figure A.1 summarizes the two cases: The disciplinary eﬀect is weaker in the
region λ∗ < λ < λB.
Case 3 : δ < δ1 and λ∗ < λ < λ∗∗. The regulator never close troubled banks, and
in response, banks raise the maximum deposits.
Case 4 : δ < δ1 and and λ is either greater than λ∗∗ or less than λ∗. The Regulator
closes the insolvent bank only if there is a healthy bank to take it over. Suppose bank
2These conditions ensures that q > q∗1 , α < α
∗
2 and λB > λ1. The last condition λB > λ1 requires
q to be large and α to be small as shown below. I ignore the multiple equilibria from Proposition 2.
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λC λ1 λ
∗ λB λ∗∗
PLR
DF
λ
D
(λ
)
Without Commitment
With Commitment
Figure A.1: Commitment and Time Inconsistency
The Bank's Capital Structure: δ > δ1
i conjecture Dˆj > PLR, banks maximizes Π2 which is equal to[q
2PH + (1− q)2PL](R−DF ) + q(1− q)∆M(DF )− (I −DF ) if D = DF
[q2PH + (1− q)PL](R− PLR) + q(1− q)∆M(PLR)− (I − PLR) if D = PLR
⇒ D2 =
DF if λ > λ2PLR if λ < λ2
When λ < λ2, the bank issues extra equity, and when λ > λB, the bank chooses
maximum deposits. There could be multiple equilibria in λ2 < λ < λB. Therefore,
the disciplinary eﬀect must be weaker in max{λ∗, λ2} < λ < λB, and may be weaker
in min{λ∗, λ2} < λ < max{λ∗, λ2}, as shown in Figure A.2.
In summary, the lack of commitment dampens the disciplinary eﬀect.
A.2.2 Alternative Benchmark
In the main model, I assume that the acquisition cannot be completed if the healthy
bank does not have adequate regulatory capital. As an alternative benchmark, healthy
bank can issue additional equity, and I will show that ﬁnancial contagion could be
alleviated as well. Therefore, ﬁnancial contagion and aggravated resolution costs are
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Figure A.2: Commitment and Time Inconsistency, Alternative Case
The Bank's Capital Structure: δ < δ1
both driven by accounting measurement issues.
To illustrate this point, I only study the extreme case of LCM regime and assume
banks always raise DF . The healthy bank needs to issue at least φPLR equity, and
the balance sheet becomes:
I + PLR︸ ︷︷ ︸
risky investments
+DF − PLR︸ ︷︷ ︸
subsidy
+ φPLR︸ ︷︷ ︸
additional equity
= (DF +DF )︸ ︷︷ ︸
total deposits
+E + (φPLR)︸ ︷︷ ︸
capital
Therefore, if only one investment succeeds, the conglomerate will fail if and only if
R−PLR+φPLR < DF , i.e., ﬁnancial contagion happens less frequently. Furthermore,
the regulator's costs will always decrease relative to the main model because of the
additional equity φPLR.
If this is the full story, marking up seems to unambiguously increase the regulator's
costs. However, the above argument misses an important point: the healthy bank
may not have the appropriate incentive given additional equity is required. We have
observed in reality (see, for example, the S&L crisis in footnote 2) that massive bank
failures can lead to capital crunch for healthy banks; as a result, the regulator must
provide stronger incentives to healthy banks.
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A.2.3 Capital Structure under LCM
In this section, I examine the bank's capital structure decision under LCM. Similar to
the main model, if bank i believes Dˆj ≤ PLR, it will follow a switching strategy at λB
because there is no opportunity to engage in risk-shifting. In contrast, if Dˆj > PLR,
bank i anticipates that j will be closed at L. However, because mark-up is not allowed
under LCM, bank i will not have enough capital to absorb j unless it has raised
extra capital at date 1. Speciﬁcally, the balance sheet must satisfy
I −Di
I + PLR
≥ φ to
complete the acquisition, i.e., Di ≤ DF −φPLR. Denote DT .= DF −φPLR, and bank
i chooses among DF , PLR, or DT .
Proposition 8. Given the conjecture Dˆj > PLR,
1. Di = DF if and only if λ is suﬃciently large.
2. Otherwise, Di = DT or Di = PLR are both possible, depending on the parame-
ters.
Proof. First, I compare DT with PLR: PLR < DT ⇔ λ > λL = 1− DF
qR + qRφ
. It is
easy to verify that λL < λB.
Case 1 : λ > λL. bank i can already acquire j at Di = PLR⇒
ΠL1 (DF ) = qPH(R−DF )− (I −DF )
ΠL2 (PLR) = [(1− q)PL + q2PH ](R− PLR) + q(1− q)∆M(PLR)− (I − PLR)
ΠL3 (DT ) = q
2PH(R−DT ) + q(1− q)∆M(DT )− (I −DT )
(i) First, ⇒ ΠL1 (DF ) − ΠL2 (PLR) = DF − PLR + qPH(R − DF ) − [(1 − q)PL +
q2PH ](R − PLR) − q(1 − q)∆M(PLR). This equation is always increasing in
λ. When λ → 1, the equation is positive; when λ → λF , the equation is
negative if and only if α is suﬃciently small. Deﬁne the threshold above which
ΠL1 (DF ) > Π
L
2 (PLR) as λ
∗
1.
(ii) Next, I compare ΠL2 (PLR) with Π
L
3 (DT ): If R > 2PLR, Π
L
2 (PLR) − ΠL3 (DT ) is
decreasing in λ. When λ → λF , the equation is positive; when λ → 1, it is
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negative. In a similar manner, I prove that ΠL2 (PLR) − ΠL3 (DT ) is decreasing
in λ in case of R < DT + PLR or DT + PLR < R < 2PLR. So I can deﬁne the
threshold below which ΠL2 (PLR) > Π
L
3 (DT ) as λ
∗
2.
(iii) Lastly, I compare ΠL1 (DF ) with Π
L
3 (DT ). Π
L
1 (DF ) − ΠL3 (DT ) ∝ L1(λ), where
L1(λ) is a quadratic function and L
′′
1(λ) > 0. When λ→ 1, L1(1) > 0, so there
exists a λ∗3 such that Π
L
3 (DT ). Π
L
1 (DF )− ΠL3 (DT ) > 0⇔ λ > λ∗3.
Case 2 : λ < λL, bank i must further lower its leverage to DT to be able to j.
ΠL4 (PLR) = q(R− PLR)− (I − PLR)
ΠL5 (DT ) = [(1− q)PLq2PH ](R−DT ) + q(1− q)∆M(DT )− (I −DT )
According to lemma 1, because λ < λB, ΠL4 (PLR) > Π
L
1 (DF ) and I only need to
compare the two equations above. ΠL4 (PLR)−ΠL5 (DT ) is strictly decreasing in λ. At
λ = λL or λ = λC , the sign is ambiguous.
In sum, given Dˆj > PLR, Di = DF if λ is suﬃciently large. It depends on the
parameters when bank i will choose Di = DT and Di = PLR.
Proposition 8 is similar to Proposition 2. When accounting is too informative,
holding extra capital to prevent closure becomes too costly. In addition, the bene-
ﬁt from acquiring j also declines, as chances are slim that the impaired assets will
succeed. In response, the bank forfeits the option of risk-shifting and raises the
maximum deposits. However, when accounting is not very informative, the bank
may choose Di = DT or Di = PLR depending on the parameters. The problem
becomes intractable, because there are too many moving parts. In summary, even
though the equilibrium cannot be solved analytically, I conﬁrm that the assumption
Di = Dj = DF is indeed reasonable.
A.3 Historical Data
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Table A.2: Summary of Resolution Costs to the FDIC, 1986-2017
P&A agreement Depositor Payoﬀ Assistance
Number of Failure 2, 307 215 116
Average Assets (thousands) 552, 110 197, 063 164, 581
Average Cost (thousands) 71, 693 70, 145 16, 112
Average Cost-to-Asset Ratio 13.0% 35.5% 9.8%
Total Costs (billions) 165.40 15.03 1.87
a Source: FDIC, Historical Statistics on Banking.https://www5.fdic.gov/hsob/
b Notes: The table only includes resolutions for which estimated costs were available
and excludes transactions where it was not determined.
c The ﬁrst column includes Purchase and Assumption, Insured Deposit Transfer and
MGR. The second column includes direct payout. The third column includes bridge
bank, open bank assistance and reprivatization.
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Figure A.3: Resolution Costs to the FDIC by Year, 1986-2017
Data Source: FDIC, Historical Statistics on Banking
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Figure A.4: The S&L Crisis: Capital-to-Asset Ratio for the Savings and Loan
Industry
Source: The Great Savings and Loan Debacle by J. Barth 1991. GAAP capital consists
of permanent, preferred and common stock and returned earnings. TAP(tangible) capital
equals GAAP capital minus goodwill and other intangibles. RAP capital essentially equals
GAAP capital plus deferred loan losses, appraised equity capital, regulatory forbearance
such as the amortization of goodwill over peiords longer than those prescribed by GAAP,
etc.
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Figure A.5: The S&L Crisis: Regulatory Actions Against Failed Thrifts
Source: The Great Savings and Loan Debacle by J. Barth 1991. Liquidation and assisted
mergers, generally referred to as resolutions, were meant to be ﬁnal and impose costs on the
FSLIC. A supervisory merger was also meant to be ﬁnal and not to impose cost on FSLIC.
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